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In 1995, the NSF officially shut down the NSFNet backbone, thereby ending the nascent Internets
early architecture as a single backbone network. Today, the Internet is a group of loosely
interconnected networks run by many diverse companies. These interconnections are in no way
controlled by any industry or government agency, and are therefore held together only by the
market demands of the Internet community. Although the FCC has traditionally maintained a
stance of
"unregulation"
of all information and computer networks, they have increasingly show
interest in ensuring the rapid deployment of Internet access. In addition, as more and more critical
elements of communication are implemented on the Internet, some safeguards ensuring end-to-end
connectivity, and therefore on maintaining the interconnection between networks, are needed. This
paper discusses the history and evolution of Internet interconnections, compares and contrasts them
to traditional telephony interconnections, and explores the possibility of regulation over such
connections. This paper covers events up to the end of 1999.
Introduction
Today's Internet grew out of the National Science Foundation's (NSF) NSFNet, which was
an extension of the experimental US Department ofDefense's ARPANET. In 1993, after years of
exponential growth, the NSF issued a solicitation requesting responses to and bids on four separate
components that represented major changes in the architecture of the nascent Internet. These
changes were necessitated by the tremendous growth of the NSFNet over the prior few years, and
the push, by private and commercial interests, to allow traffic other than that related to research or
education (which was stipulated by the Acceptable Use Policy of the NSFNet). Instead of a single
Internet backbone, there would be many, and they would interconnect to each other at Network
Access Points (NAPS).
The Internet, as a network ofNetworks, depends on interconnections as much as it depends
on something as basic as network
capacity.1
Every Internet Service Provider (ISP) must inter-
operate with other ISPs in order to deliver comprehensive, end-to-end Internet services. No ISP can
operate in isolation from others or users on that ISP's network would not be able to reach users on
other networks. When the changes actually occurred in early 1995, many issues of these new
network to network interconnections, such as which networks should interconnect to others, who
should pay and for what, etc., were left unanswered and unresolved. The end result of this
indecision was a bill and keep, sender keep all model, in which the network of packet origination
charged their customer and kept all of the money, rather than
"settle"
with the network of packet
destination. In the early days, the Internet operators favored network connectivity over all other
issues, including short-term profits. Over the past several years, the industry has evolved to the
1
Norton,William. "Interconnection Strategies for ISPs: The Application of a Neutral Internet
Business
Exchange."
point that most network providers are now trying to attain profitability. The interconnection model
has evolved from an open, non-discriminatory model in which networks connected to each other
under nearly any circumstance just to maintain end-to-end reachability, to a hierarchical and
somewhat discriminatory nature, in which large ISPs no longer openly peer with all others, but
instead, under non-disclosure agreements, try to force smaller ISPs to pay them for
interconnections.
If this were the only change, perhaps industry led self-regulation (there have been several
such proposals) would be adequate to maintain end-to-end reachability for all users. However,
several other issues cloud the picture and make that scenario unlikely. First, the Internet is evolving
from a network used for data transfer only to one that is beginning to handle more traditional
telecommunications services such as telephony. As a data network, the Internet is classified as an
"enhanced
service"
and is therefore not subject to regulation based on the Communications Act of
1934 and the subsequent updated Telecommunications Act of 1996. Telephone companies and
cable companies are beginning to offer Internet services, further clouding the line between the
separate services and separate networks. The merging of the traditional, circuit-switched network
used to handle telephone calls, the cable television network, and the packet-switched Internet seems
very likely.
In light of such
"convergence,"
the Federal Communications Commission may need to re
evaluate its dichotomy between "enhanced
services,"
such as the traditional Internet and cable
television networks which are not subject to regulation, and "basic
services,"
which include
standard telephone service and is subject to regulation. These issues and their relation to
traditionally regulated telecommunications areas such as telephone company interconnection
requirements, access charges, reciprocal compensation, the universal service fund, along with other
Internet facets that are facing government scrutiny, may indicate that the future of Internet
interconnections is a future of government regulation.
This thesis covers these issues in depth from a United States ofAmerica-centric viewpoint.
Although Internet interconnection agreements are important all over the world, the state of
government regulation in telecommunications is different in nearly every country, so covering them
all is obviously not possible. As the U.S. has set an example of Internet development and
telecommunications deregulation, focusing on the U.S. should give adequate insight into what may
transpire around the world. . In Section I, the origins of the Internet are briefly discussed, followed
by an in-depth description of the history of the NSFNet and the issues that led to its dissolution in
1995. Section I also explores the developments of Internet interconnections from the NSFNet
dissolution to today. Section II discusses the history of traditional telephony interconnection
requirements and settlement mechanisms, and why such mechanisms are much more difficult to
define and implement on the Internet. Section III covers the history of FCC regulations over
Internet services, as well as current regulatory issues the Internet has created for the FCC, including
how the Internet has affected reciprocal compensation and access charge regulations, open
access/unbundling requirements in the last mile, the effects of convergence on the universal service
fund, etc. Finally, Section IV explores the possibilities of the future of Internet interconnections,
by first looking at a few Industry proposed
"self-regulated"
models and then the possibility of future
government regulation. This thesis concludes that the Internet will not be able to live under the
umbrella of
"non-regulation"
due to its current status as an "enhanced
service"
as defined by the
FCC. Instead, the dichotomy between basic and enhanced services will need to be re-evaluated, and
in so doing, Internet interconnections will likely be regulated to ensure universal service on the
"converged
network."
Section I - The History of Internet Interconnections
Section I will explore in detail the history of Internet interconnections. It is important to
understand this history to really grasp all of the issues involved in interconnections as well as to
see how the industry has evolved to its current state. The origins of the Internet are discussed,
from the beginning with the start of ARPANet, to the growth of the NSFNet and its eventual
dissolution, up to the Internet as we know it today.
Origins of the Internet
The Internet first started to take shape in the mid 1960's when the United State's Air Force
commissioned Paul Baran of RAND to study how it could maintain control over its disperse
geographic sites in the aftermath of a nuclear
war.2
In his series of papers "On Distributed
Communications
Networks3,"
Baran proposed a packet switched network with no central hub or
control processor, in which packets would be forwarded from place to place until they reached
their final destination. The main premise behind this theory was that if any given node were lost
due to nuclear bombing (or any other disaster for that matter) traffic would still be able to route
around that node and reach its final
destination.4
At that point in time, no such networking




Internet Timeline v4.0. Available at URL:
http ://info . isoc.org/guest/zakon/Internet/History/HIT.html
3
Baran, Paul. "On Distributed Communications
Networks."
RAND memorandum RM-3420-PR.
August, 1964. Available at URL: http://www.rand.org/publications/RM/RM3420/.
4
Tappendorf, Sean. The ARPANET and Beyond. URL Available at:
http://clavin.music.uiuc.edu/sean/internet history.html. July 30, 1995.
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ARPANet
In the late 1960's, the United States Department of Defense commissioned the Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to further research computer
networking,5
and in 1969, the
experimental network called ARPANET was turned online using 56 kilobits per second (Kbps)
lines. It was experimental in the sense that it was testing packet switching as a method for data
transport,6
something that had never been done before. In the early to mid-1970's, several issues
arose with the network protocol then in use, including problems with the addressing scheme.
ARPA assigned the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) to solve the problems with a new protocol.
In 1973, Vint Cerf and his group at SRI developed Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP). In 1976, the ARPANet began experimenting with this new technology which
would become the Internet's packet switching protocol and is still in use today. However, it was
not until January of 1983 that all computers on the network were required to use
it.7
During the later 1970's, the ARPANet grew to support many of the organizations of the
U.S. Department ofDefense and other government agencies, including the National Aeronautical
and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Reserve Board, and the National Science
Foundation
(NSF).8
It also began to support both Universities and research organizations.
Thousands of hosts, generally those at Universities and government agencies, connected to this
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Halabi, Bassam. 1997. Internet Routing Architectures. Cisco Press, (p. 3)
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The ARPANet continued to exist through the mid 1980's, and in 1984, the Department of
Defense separated the military portion of the network, termed MILNET, from the rest of
ARPANet. This left non-military government agencies, universities, and research organizations
as the organizations that remained on the
ARPANet.10
It was at this point that the National
Science Foundation entered computer-networking arena.
NSFNet
In 1984, the National Science Foundation (NSF) created five super computer centers so that
people could purchase time on them for research purposes. These five super computer centers were
attached to each other at 56 Kbps via a network the NSF established, and the NSF backbone was
connected to
ARPANET."
The five super computer centers were the Cornell Theory Center at
Cornell University, the National Center for Supercomputing Applications at the University of
Illinois, the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center, the San Diego Supercomputer Center at the
University of California, San Diego, and the Jon Von Neumann Center at Princeton University.
Later, the National Center for Atmospheric Research was connected.
By 1985, the ARPANET had become heavily used and congested, and the NSF initiated
phase I development of the
NSFNet.12
This network was composed ofmultiple regional networks
and university computer centers Merit, NCAR, BARRNet, MIDnet, Westnet, NorthWestNet, and
10
ARPANET-U.S. DOD-SPONSORED NETWORK, URL Available at:
http://www.chaos.com/learn/Historv.html
11
Tappendorf, Sean. The ARPANET and Beyond. July 30, 1995. URL:
http://clavin.music.uiuc.edu/sean/internet history.html. July 30, 1995.
12
Halabi, Bassam. 1997. Internet Routing Architectures. Cisco Press, (p. 4)
12
SESQUTNet.13
Additionally, the two networks NYSERNet and JVNCnet were also connected as
each was collocated at a supercomputer center. These components were connected to the NSFNet
backbone in a three-tier hierarchy. Campus and research organizations connected to regional
networks, which in turn connected to the NSFNet
backbone.14
The original links interconnecting
the backbone nodes were 56kbps, and the original routers were LSI-II
Fuzzballs.15
The NSFNet grew so much that in the fall of 1987 the NSF issued a competitive solicitation
to provide a new, faster backbone service to link the six super computer centers and seven mid-level
networks.16
In November of 1987, the NSF awarded a contract to Merit Network, Inc., in
partnership with IBM, MCI, and the state of Michigan, to upgrade and operate the NSFNet
backbone using Tl (1.544 Mbps) links. This upgrade was completed on July 1st, 1988 (just 8
months after the solicitation), and on July 24th, 1988, the old 56 Kbps NSFNet was shut off.
In 1989, the backbone was reengineered by increasing the Tl's so that each site had
redundant connections to the backbone, and the router capabilities were increased to handle full
Tl's. By this time, 500 million packets per month were being switched, which was an increase of
500% in just one
year.17
In January of 1989, the three companies running the NSFNet (Merit, IBM,
andMCI) presented a plan to upgrade the network to T3 (approximately 45Mbps) speeds in order to
handle the rapidly increasing traffic. IBM developed the first router capable of handling T3 speeds
on an RS/6000 subset ofUnix. This router would eventually be able to handle 100,000 packets per
second. For this upgrade, the NSF wanted a number of new nodes added, and therefore issued a
13
Harris, Susan R., and Gerich, Elise. "Retiring the NSFNET Backbone Service: Chronicling the
End of an
Era."
URL: http://www.merit.edu/nsfriet/retire.connecions.html. (p. 1)
14
Halabi, Bassam. 1997. Internet Routing Architectures. Cisco Press, (p. 5)
15
Harris, Susan R., and Gerich, Elise. "Retiring the NSFNET Backbone Service: Chronicling the
End of an
Era."






solicitation to anyone who was interested in becoming a new NSF site. The new sites granted were
Cambridge, MA's NEARNET, Chicago's Argonne National Lab, and Atlanta GA's
SURANet.18
In September of 1990, MCI, IBM, and Merit created the company Advanced Network and
Services
(ANS).19
Merit provided the policy routing database, routing consultation, and
management services ofNSFNet, whereas ANS operated the backbone routers and had a Network
Operations Center (NOC). Basically, ANS was created to operate the 45Mbps backbone. IBM and
MCI each gave $4 million to the network and ANS acted as a subcontractor to Merit. The final T3
was installed in November of 1991, and at that time the network had 16 sites with total of 3500
networks
connected.20
The Beginning ofCommercialization and Privatization oftheNSFNet
In early 1992, just after the upgrade to T3 had been completed, a contentious debate about the
evolution and commercialization of the US Internet
began.21
ISP's, including those that provided
local dial-up services and those that provided Tl's and TCP/IP products and services, were
springing up all over the country. In addition, the NSFNet backbone had reached "critical
mass"
-




Before the NSF had reached
this level, users in the commercial domain that wanted to send email were limited to sending to
18
Harris, Susan R., and Gerich, Elise. "Retiring the NSFNET Backbone Service: Chronicling the
End of an
Era."
URL: http://www.merit.edu/nsfnet/retire.connecions.html. (p. 2)
19
Halabi, Bassam. 1997. Internet Routing Architectures. Cisco Press, (p. 4)
20




Directory. URL http://boardwatch.internet.com/isp/internetarch.html. (p.3)
21
Harris, Susan R., and Gerich, Elise. "Retiring the NSFNET Backbone Service: Chronicling the
End of an
Era."
URL: http://www.merit.edu/nsfriet/retire.connecions.html. (p. 2)
14
those users attached to the same network. With the ability to send email from network to network,
the NSFNet grew even more. There was such a large user population, and participation was so
high, that it became a thing in itself to connect your private network to the NSFNet. And the more
small networks that attached to it, the more attractive it became to get attached. At this early date,
THE Internet was defined as having connectivity to the NSFNet.
23
Between 1988 and mid-1990, an Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) had required that all
backbone traffic "further research and other scholarly
activities."24
The language of the AUP
changed slightly in 1990 such that the NSFNet's purpose was redefined "to support research and
education in and among academic institutions in the U.S. by [providing] access to unique resources
and the opportunity for collaborative
work.25"
However, by 1992 there were many pressures being
felt on the NSFNet for commercial and general-purpose groups that wanted network access26. ISPs
were emerging to accommodate this need, thereby defining a new industry, while international
networks had developed and also wanted to connect. The Internet was no longer an experiment in
computer networking, and much of the Internet's traffic had little to do with anything the National
Science Foundation was charted to do. The obvious solution was to privatize it - to allow
commercial companies to operate it and sell access to it.
22
Rickard, Jack. "Yet Another Unique Moment in the Time Peering Redux
- Back to the Future
and the Essentials of a Competitive
Internet."
Boardwatch Magazine, Editor's Notes. May
1998.
23
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Discussions relating to the commercialization and privatization of the Internet began as early





of 1990 entitled "Commercialization and
Privatization"
which was held at the
John F. Kennedy School ofGovernment, Harvard University. This workshop explored the issues of





Stephen Wolf, then Director of the NSF Division of Networking and Communications




on the basis of
his experience in deploying policy for the NSFNet as follows:
Commercialization: permitting commercial users and providers to access and use
Internet facilities and services
Privatization: elimination of the federal role in providing or subsidizing network
services.
The resulting publication of the conference (RFC 1 192) suggested that "offering the NSFNet
backbone at no cost to authorized networks both encourages undisciplined use of the backbone and
inhibits private investment in backbone
networks."
The workshop provided several options ofwhat
to do, including charging the regional networks or moving the subsidy down to the campus level or
the researchers themselves. It came down to funding the backbone or funding the researchers,
institutions, or regionals. Privatization might be achieved by shifting the federal subsidy from
network providers to users, thus spurring private sector investment in network services, but there
were several issues with this idea. There were concerns over the acceptable use policy, but with a
private/commercial network, the nature of the traffic would not have to be bound to the NSF's
28
Kahin, B., Editor. Commercialization of the Internet Summary Report, RFC 1192. November
1990. URL available at http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/htbin/rfc/rfcl 192.html.
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charter. Also, at that time, there were several commercial services such as Lexis, Dialog, and Orbit,
but they were not widely used and the services themselves were generally unaware of their own
potential. The conference concluded that "without a critical mass of users, commercialization may
need to precede
privatization."
There were no real actions drawn from the conference, but it should
be remembered that the conference was held in 1990.
Back to 1992: there continued a great discussion regarding the commercialization and
privatization of the
NSFNet.29
Private networks paid for by private monies were starting to grow,
and many sought direct or indirect access to the NSFNet. (The AUP did not restrict such
connections, if, in one-way or another, the added network could support the
mission.)30
Should the
government fund and operate something that competed with private companies such as Sprint, MCI,
UUNET, CompuServe, Performance Systems International (PSI), and others, when a growing
amount of traffic was becoming more and more commercial? In some senses, the network was
already private
- or at least certain aspects of it were. The physical circuits were owned by the
private sector, and the logical network was managed and operated by the private sector. Nonprofit
regional networks attached to the NSFNet were increasingly contracting out routine operations such
as network operations centers (while retaining control ofpolicy and planning
functions).31
At the backbone level, the NSF was contributing less than $3 million of an annual $10
million in expenses. The State of Michigan gave $1 million, and the rest was covered by the
subcontractors Merit, IBM, and MCI. At the regional level, the NSF was covering 40% of
29
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operating costs. There was no federal funding of the Campus level networks, which were estimated
to be seven to ten times larger in annual investments than the mid-level
networks.32
The NSF allowed the NSFNet to connect commercial users and relax the strict limits of use
on the backbone. In 1992, Representative Rick Boucher's subcommittee on Science, Research, and
Technology asked the Office of the Inspector General to conduct an investigation into the legalities
of the NSF's move towards privatization. The Office of the Inspector General concluded that the
NSF did in fact have the power to relax the AUP, and Rep. Boucher then attached an amendment to
the NSF Authorization Act of 1993 to explicitly state
so.33
With the push towards commercialization and privatization, there were many different views
on what should happen. "IBM and MCI had essentially built the NSF backbone, and claimed to
have an identical private backbone, using the same rooms, the same equipment, and the same
technicians as the NSF
backbone."34
Both companies thought they should inherit the backbone
because of their considerable investments in it. However, there was a small group of outspoken
critics, including Rick Adams of AlterNet (now UUNET, one of the largest Internet Service
Providers and now owned byMCIWorldcom), Marty Shafkowits and Bill Schrader ofPerformance
Systems International (PSI, still a large ISP) and several others. Their view was that a government
program funded by tax dollars should not be given to a private company, and they made sufficient
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Internet."
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Commercial Internet eXchange (CIX)
Before the debate began, back in 1991, private network operators including PSI Net, General
Atomics (renamed CerfNet, then bought by TCG, and then by AT&T), and UUNET formed an
exchange point called the Commercial Internet Exchange (CLX) in
UUNET'
s Falls Church, VA
offices to help facilitate commercial networking. CLX was created due to a mixture of events.
ANS had threatened to charge networks for connections to the NSF
backbone35
and the increasing
burden commercial traffic was having on the NSFNet (despite the AUP restricting such traffic) had
some networks concerned. The goal of CLX was not necessarily to relieve the traffic loads on the
backbone, but to instead facilitate the exchange of traffic between private networks. In fact, most
commercial traffic still crossed the NSFNet backbone even after CLX had been
created.36
However,
the CLX was an early start on commercialization.
CIX had many important implications for the future of the Internet as described here. First,
there was a fundamental agreement that all CLX members would interconnect with one another and
there would be no restrictions on the type of traffic that could be routed between each network.
Also, there would be no
"settlements"
or any traffic-based charges between CLX member networks.
Basically, this meant no network could charge another for interconnecting or the traffic that was
exchanged.
One obvious benefit for CLXmembers was that as the networks connected to each other, they
instantly had access to each other's users and services, greatly increasing the value of their network
connection. Of course, this was true of connecting to the NSFNet as well; except with the NSFNet,
35
Depalma, Jennifer. Maturation in a Fee Market: The Changing Dynamics of Peering in the ISP
Industry. Forthcoming from the Cato Institute under Telecommunications Policy Analysis:
http://www.cato.org/research/telecom-st.html.
36






there were AUP restrictions on what the nature of the traffic was allowed to be. (It should also be
noted that CLX had other benefits to members that are not directly related to the evolution of
Internet interconnections. One such example is that it provided a neutral forum to develop
consensus positions on legislative and policy issues.)
Perhaps the most important aspect of CLX, and one that was most likely not noticed at the
time, was that it was the
1st
point of interconnection for the networks attached to the NSFNet
backbone that did not actually cross the NSFNet backbone. This would become an early model for
Internet Interconnection as the NSFNet was dissolved.
Other Developments
Similar to the CLX, except for Federal institutions such as the NASA Science Internet (NSI),
the Department ofEnergy's ESNet, DARPANet, etc., the Federal Internet eXchange was created to
exchange traffic with member networks at a place other than the NSFNet
backbone.37
In addition,
on the private sector side, MFS DATANET established the Metropolitan Area Ethernets (MAES) in
Washington, D.C., and San Francisco. These two developments are important because of the
precedence they set as exchange architectures. Rather than each network attaching to the NSFNet
backbone in order to exchange traffic with one another, they could interconnect directly with one
another, and other networks, at a shared facility.
37
NSF 93-52 - Network Access PointManager, Routing Arbiter, Regional Network Providers, and
Very High Speed Backbone Network Services Provider for the NSFNET and the NREN (SM)
Program. May 6, 1993. National Science Foundation.
20
Dissolution of NSFNet
"The early years of the Internet, under the management of the NSF, were characterized by
sharing, bound together in part by technical
necessity."38
With a single common backbone and
lack of private interests trying to be profitable, there was a common bond to create a network that
everyone could easily attach to. However, the network grew, and a new architecture had to be
created. The sharing and openness of the early days would continue through the dissolution of the
NSFNet, but only for a short time beyond that.
Why the solicitation was needed
The NSFNet had started out serving its original purpose well
- it had established a backbone
network that regional networks connected to, which in turn attached to universities and government
networks. They all followed the NSF's charter and Acceptable Use Policy (AUP), which was to
"further research and other scholarly
activities"
and later "to support research and education in and
among academic institutions in the U.S. by [providing] access to unique resources and the
opportunity for collaborative
work.39"
The NSF had supported the data networking needs of
research and education since 1 986 and had become an essential infrastructure for that community.
The number of users and the number of connected networks, along with the amount of network
traffic continue to grow rapidly. By 1993, the network of networks, which had just started to be
called the Internet, connected 10,000 IP networks, which had more than one million computers and
millions of users throughout the
world.40
Data networking had evolved considerably since the
38
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inception of the NSFNet, and new companies had been created while a number of existing
companies had shown increasing interest in the field.
For these reasons, and due to the expiration of the Cooperative Agreement for the NSFNet
Backbone, a new architecture was needed. The NSF formulated specifications for such a design in
a solicitation entitled "NSF 93-52 - Network Access Point Manager, Routing Arbiter, Regional




NSF 93-52, issued in May of 1993, would radically alter the architecture of the Internet. In
short, the NSF was getting out of the backbone business. The solicitation had four main points as
described here:
1 . Create a set ofNetwork Access Points (NAPs) where major network providers
would connect their networks, exchange route advertisements, and exchange
traffic.
2. Implement a Route Arbiter (RA) project to facilitate the exchange of policies
and addressing ofmultiple providers connected to the NAPs.
3. Find a provider of a very high-speed Backbone Network Service (vBNS) for
educational and governmental purposes.
4. Transition existing and/or realigned regional networks to
support interregional
connectivity by connection to NSPs that would be connected to NAPs or by
connecting directly to NAPs. Any NSP selected for this purpose had to be
41
Kahin, B., Editor. Commercialization of the Internet Summary Report, RFC 1192. November
1990. URL available at http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/htbin/rfc/rfcl 192.html.
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connected to at least 3 of the NAPs. (An NSP was defined as "a network
service provider that connected to all of the NSF priority NAPs and provides,
at aminimum, IP internetworking service at DS1
speeds.")42
The focus of this paper is most concerned with number one, the creation of NAPs where
routing updates and traffic would be exchanged. This was the true start of "Internet
interconnections,"
where different networks connected to each another directly, rather than the prior
model where the NSFNet backbone was the
"intermediary"
connection point. (See Diagrams 1 and
2) Part four of the solicitation is of secondary concern in this paper, as the regionals would have to
interconnect to NSPs in order to remain
"connected"
to the Internet.
Diagram 1: How ISP's connected to each other before NAPs were created. Here, the
NSFNET was a nationwide network run by the NSF:
42
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Diagram 2: How networks attached to each other after NAPs were created. ISPs would
generally connect at two or more geographically disperse NAPs (not shown here). The ISPs could
be small regional sized networks are large national networks.
?
NAP Switch
As previously stated, the solicitation sought to totally transform the nascent Internet. As it
stood, the NSF backbone provided the Interconnection for all of the networks, except for the CLX
and FIX interconnection points. However, after the implementation of the solicitation, there would
no longer be a single backbone. Instead, there would be several national backbone providers (the
NSPs) that would interconnect at the NAPs, which were quite similar in concept to the CLX and
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FIX. The move was away from a core backbone to a distributed architecture operated by
commercial
providers.43
The due date for responses to the solicitation was August 17, 1993.
Network Access Points (NAPs)
NSF 93-52 defined an InternetNAP as "a high speed network or switch to which a number of
networks can be connected via routers for the purpose of traffic exchange and
interoperation."
The solicitation further specified that NAPs should "have adequate capacity to keep up with the
switching requirements of the attached
networks"
and that the "attached networks are presumed to
be a part of the connected Internet, but the NAP itselfmay be of a lower protocol layer; e.g. it may
be a level two network or
switch."
The solicitation went so far as to say that the NAP would be a
conceptual evolution of the FIX and CIX Internet exchange points, and gave examples ofwhat the
NAP switching fabric could be: LAN, MAN (using SMDS), or a high speed switch such as ATM.
Another important aspect of the solicitation for NAPs was that traffic on these new exchange
points would not be restricted to the NSFNet backbone's AUP (e.g. "that which is in support of
research and education"). In other words, there would no longer be restrictions on the type of traffic
that could cross the network. Therefore, this was the true start of commercialization and
privatization of the Internet.
NSF 93-52 specified three priority locations for NAPs
- California, Chicago, and New York
City. It further listed desirable locations as Atlanta, Denver, Boston, Texas, andWashington, D.C.
43
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The solicitation further defined what the anticipated duties of the NAP manager organizations
would be, as listed below:
Establish, operate, andmaintain ... all or a subset of the specifiedNAPS.
Develop and establish attachment policies, including attachment fee schedules,
which should be fair and equitable. The fees were to be proposed by NAP managers
in their response to the solicitation, but final approval would be granted by the NSF.
Propose NAP locations subject to the priority and desirable cities listed in the
solicitation.
Specify reliability and security standards for the NAPs.
Specify and provide appropriate NAP accounting and statistics.
In the end, the NSF awarded four NAPs as
follows:44
1 . Sprint NAP - Pennsauken, NJ
2. PacBell NAP - San Francisco, CA
3. Ameritech Advanced Data Services (AADS) NAP - Chicago, IL
4. MFS DataNet (MAE-E) NAP - Washington, D.C.
The NSFNet physically attached to Sprint NAP in September of 1994; the PacBell NAP in
October of 1994, to the AADS NAP in January of 1995, and to MAE-E in March of 1995. MAE-E
had actually been doing Internet interconnections on a significant basis before the other three NAPs
were up and running and the NFS grant to this NAP was contentious45. MAE-E was only a
10Mbps Ethernet, and the solicitation had listed a requirement of 100M or more. MFS did upgrade
44
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to 100M Fiber Distributed Data Interchange (FDDI), and, though there was still some contention
due to the fact that ATM was the solicitation's desired switching fabric, MAE-E was never-the-less
granted the status of an official NAP. The fact that MAE-E was run by MFS, a neutral
3rd
party,
was also seen as an
attraction.46
The other 3 NAP managers were not quite as neutral as MFS was.
PacBell and Ameritech were local telephone companies that at the time were just entering the
Internet access business, whereas Sprint was a major provider of Internet backbone services.
Importance ofNAPs
NAPs provided the foundation ofnetwork interconnections that allowed the Internet to be just
that - a network of networks. When they were first created, they provided a logical, scalable, and
cost effective way to connect networks. Private backbone networks could interconnect and
exchange traffic directly at the NAPs, rather than indirectly on an intermediary backbone such as
the NSFNet.
The geographic location of NAPs was (and still is) quite important. First, the more
interconnections points between two networks, the more efficient traffic could flow. For example,
in diagram 3 below, ISP A and ISP B only interconnect at one point, so all of there traffic must pass
through that point. This is both inefficient and can lead to major outages if there is a problem at that
one point.
46







If ISP A and ISP B interconnected at two points, as shown in Diagram 4, traffic flow could be
more efficient and there would be more redundancy.
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Diagram 4:
The Internet evolved around shortest exit routing (sometimes called hot potato routing).
What this means is that traffic originating on network A should be sent to the destination network B
at the
"nearest"
interconnection between A and B. Therefore, the more NAPs there are near the
origination and/or destination, the less backbone infrastructure for each single network is needed.
This is depicted in Diagram 5, in which the NAPs have been replaced with simple communications
links for simplicity. In this case, packets from the end user to the destination computer would go
over interconnection point 1, since that is the
"closer"
link. Packets from the destination computer
back to the end user, would travel over interconnection point 2, because in that direction, that link is









Shortest exit routing and the existence of several NAPs also established the fact that
interconnections were good thing. A good way to understand this is with a counter example. If
network A and network B only interconnect at the MAE-E NAP, then a network A end-user in
California that wants to reach a network B server that is also in California, would actually have to
pass traffic all the way to the east coast at the MAE-E NAP in Washington DC. Ifnetworks A and
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B also interconnected at the PacBell NAP in San Francisco, then the traffic between the two end
users in California would remain relatively local. Note that this fact means the level of redundancy
and diversity ofNAP connections affects traffic patterns ofwhole Internet.
It should be noted that there is a limit to "the more interconnections between two networks
the
better"
philosophy. There are issues with scalability and the complications many
interconnections can add to network configurations, management, operations, etc. There are also
economic scalability issues as each interconnection costs money to install, maintain, and operate.
Although NAPs were free from the NSF's AUP that restricted what kind of traffic could be






traffic could be passed. Transit traffic can be difficult to
clearly define. Generally, a given service provider "buys
transit"
from a national service provider,
to pass all their traffic to the rest of the Internet. There are anywhere from 10-15
"transit-free"
providers, meaning that they pay no other network to have
"global"
connectivity. This paying
relationship is what was prohibited at the NAPs, such that network A could not pay network B to
carry their traffic when the interconnection between A and B was handled over the NAP
infrastructure. Network A could buy transit from Network B, but their interconnection had to be at





Traffic Flow / NAP
NAPs continue to be the model of interconnection around the world as the Internet pushes its
international boundaries. As countries with more than two Internet Service Providers connect to
the Internet, a NAP architecture is generally the most cost effective, simplest way for those
providers to interconnect within their own country, rather than long hauling traffic back to the US.
Regionals
32
It is important to briefly consider the regional providers at this point, as their future in Internet
interconnections will be relevant in later discussions. The regional networks were a part of the NSF
since its inception and were a major force in providing ubiquitous network connectivity for the
research and education
communities.47
The NSF 93-52 solicitation recognized this role and
explained in detail what should happen. The NSF expected that most regionals would elect to use
an NSP to obtain inter-regional connectivity and connectivity to the
NAPs.48
The regionals could
request funding for both NAP and NSP connections from the NSF (with some restrictions), though
NSF financial support for such connections was to decline over 4 years.
The regionals that had to be moved to an NSP or NAP included all of those that had been
directly connected to the NSFNet backbone, such as SURANet and NYSERNet, but also included
other down stream networks such as NevadaNet and MoreNet. Most regionals selected
internetMCI or SprintLink as their NSPs to connect them to the rest of the
Internet.49
The deadline for moving their connections from the NSFNet to an NSP was the end of
October 1994, but the task proved to be more difficult than first thought. In mid-October 1994,
NSFNet Program Director Priscilla Huston sent a letter to the regionals asking them to send a
transition calendar and engineering overview to Merit and also asked the regionals to notify her if
they weren't going to make the October
31st
deadline for moving off
NSFNet."50
No regionals
were able to make that date, as most pushed back due to provisioning delays the NSPs had. In one
or two cases, the regional had to back out of a move to an NSP back to the NSFNet due to
47
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connectivity problems. By mid April of 1995, only seven regionals had completely disconnected
from the NSFNet. However, by the end of April, all of the regionals had been moved and the
NSFNet was officially shut
down.51
No Interconnections Guidelines Given
One major issue that the NSF did not address during the NSFNet backbone shut down was all
of the details of Internet Service Provider interconnections. The NSF defined NAPs as places
where ISPs could interconnect, and it suggested how the regionals could connect to the Internet via
the NAPs and/or NSPs. However, NAPs only provided a place for interconnecting to other ISPs,
where any one network could choose to interconnect with another network. Nevertheless, those
NSPs could also choose to not interconnect. It was and still is relatively simple to get a connection
to any NAP, but it is an entirely different and much more difficult thing to get other networks to
peer with you there. There was much debate on this subject just prior to and just after the
dissolution, but no agreements were ever
reached.52
This lack of decision would have profound
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From the NSFNet breakup until Today
Although the NSFNet was officially dissolved in April of 1995, and the Internet architecture
changed dramatically then, it has continued to evolve over the last several years. This section will
explore those changes in peering and interconnections and why they have occurred. In order to
understand some of the discussion, some service provider definitions are given first.
Service Provider Definitions
At this point, some definitions of common terms should be given so that the following
discussion can be clearly understood. Generally, there are three levels of Internet Service Providers,
though there are no agreed upon exact definitions and some providers may fit the definition ofmore
than one such
category:53
Tier 1 ISP: Tier 1 ISPs have extensive backbones capabilities, at least on a
national, if not international scale. They are connected to other tier 1 providers at
several locations in the U.S. and sometimes in other geographies as well. Tier 1
often implies that the provider is able to get all routing information about the Internet
from other tier 1 providers and does not have to pay for transit connections to
anyone. Transit is defined below.
Tier 2 ISP, Regional/mid-size: Some ISPs in this category are often national in a
sense, but they do not own significant backbone facilities, and therefore depend on
providers that have more backbone presence. Other ISPs in this category are truly
regional, tending to provide service in one particular location. (That location may be
of large size, such as the Northeastern United States, the
Mid-West, etc.) Regional
providers typically connect at one NAP or with one tier 1 provider. In areas where
53
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by Robert Gibson, though information frommany sources was used to craft them.
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they may have a backbone presence, they may peer with a tier 1, yet in other areas,
theymay buy transit services.
Tier 3 ISPs, small ISPs, and resellers: ISPs in this category generally resell
another ISPs service. Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) are sometimes
said to fit in this category, as they can not legally transport data over prescribed
service boundaries known as LATAs. However, in another sense, RBOCs are
regionals because they do have regional presence.
Peering/interconnection: In general, peering and interconnection are used
interchangeably throughout this paper. These terms describe a relationship between
two service providers in which they exchange their routes and their
customers'
routes
with each other, and neither is paying the other for this service. In other words, there
is no customer / provider relationship between the two service providers. Such
interconnections can be at public NAPs, or could be over private interconnects which
will be discussedmore below.
Transit: In a transit relationship, one provider pays another to carry traffic to
destinations that they don't get from any other peers. A transit customer can be as
simple as a customer that buys a single circuit to a single site. In this case, all of their
traffic must transit their provider's backbone to reach the rest of the Internet. A
more complicated example might be a regional provider that has peering connections
to other regionals in the same geographic region, but buys transit from one or more
national providers to get out to the rest of the Internet.
The Congestion ofthe NAPs and other Issues
The NAP model was all that existed following the NSFNet backbone dissolution. National
Service Providers connected to the NAPs, and via the NAPs to each other so that they could
exchange routing information and traffic.
The growth of the Internet has been exponential since the early days of the NSFNet
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backbone. The Graphical, Visualization, and Usability Center at the Georgia Institute of
Technology kept NSFNet traffic statistics up until the dissolution of the backbone, and also
projected traffic growth from the historical data into the short term future. This information is
available at URL:
http : //www.cc . gatech.edu/gvu/stats/NSF/merit .html
In addition, the MAE-East NAP, which is generally the largest NAP in terms of traffic,
publishes their statistics from January of 1997 until now, at http://www.mae.net/east.stats.html.
These graphs also show Internet traffic growing at exponential rates.
The NAP model uses a shared layer 2 switching fabric, and this architecture has struggled to
keep up with Internet growth. Layer 2 of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model is the data
link layer (R36). Ethernet and FDDI were the early media used by the NAPs, followed by ATM
(which covers several layers of the OSI model). What is meant by "shared layer 2 switching
fabric"
is that each provider connects to a shared device at the NAP. FDDI switches, or Ethernet (now
Fast Ethernet) switches, and ATM switches, all allow many providers to link to each other at the
data link layer.
In some cases, as the NAPs grew, one switch was not enough, so more had to be added, and
then the multiple switches of course had to connect to each other. The growth of traffic of the
Internet has far out-paced the ability of this model to scale, and it has caused packet loss and latency
for Internet traffic.
As traffic levels increase, the queues on network interfaces (i.e. on routers and
switches) lengthen. As the queues grow longer, the time a packet waits in the
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queue grows, and latency increases. As network hardware resources are finite, at
some point the queues fill, and packets get dropped.
54
When an ISP has packet loss and/or latency to another ISP because the NAP has not been
able to scale to the demand of traffic between the ISPs, all users ofboth ISPs can
suffer.55
The NSF
solicitation 93-52 did not explicitly define requirements ofwhen NAP infrastructure must be
upgraded, and to be fair to the NAP managers, the growth has been nearly impossible to keep up
with as the technology needed to support the required traffic levels has often been "a month too
late."
These issues eventually led to hybrid-private peering and later private peering, which will be
discussed below.
There were other problems with the NAPs that have slowly caused some changes to occur.
For example, recall from the "Importance of
NAPs"
section that the geographic distribution of the






even though the two computers communicating may be close to one another, the packets between
them may have to travel long distances to the point where the two
computers'
network providers
interconnect. As the four main NAPs were located in San Francisco, Chicago, New Jersey, and
Washington DC, traffic that originated, for example in Florida on a computer attached network A
and was destined for computer in Florida that was attached to network B another would actually
have to travel to the nearestNAP inWashington DC. This is depicted in diagram 7 below.
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Another issue with the NAPs is that they are often owned by a party with a vested interest in
their own ISP. Recall that the neutrality of the MFS operated MAE-E was seen as a benefit at the
time the NSF named it as an official NAP. However, MFS was bought by Worldcom, which also
owns UUNET, the worlds largest
ISP.56
Similar situations occur at the other NAPs, with AADS in
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Chicago being owned by Ameritech which runs ISP services, and with the Sprint NAP in New
Jersey, owned by Sprint, which runs an ISP service. To connect to a NAP, an ISP is forced to by a
circuit to the NAP from (in most cases) a single telephone company, which is often the same
company that owns the
NAP.57 58
This makes it difficult to get good pricing on the circuits, as
there is no real competition for circuits to the NAPs.
Hybrid Private Peering
Due to the heavy congestion at the public NAPs, which caused latency and packet loss,
hybrid private peering began to appear. This model of interconnection bypassed the
NAPs'







moving all traffic exchanged between those two ISPs to that private wire. This allowed for better
connectivity (less loss and less latency) between those two ISPs, while also alleviating the NAP
switch problems somewhat, so that those ISPs still using the switches got slightly better
performance.
Some NAPs were reluctant to allow this, some charged for the service, and some NAPs, such
as the Palo Alto Internet Exchange (PALX) were actually built around this model. In addition, a
new series ofNAPs, such as those being built by Equinox, share this model. In certain types of
NAPs, no collocated router is necessary. As collocation of a router at the NAP costs more money
due to space requirements, there are economic reasons to not have a router on site. However, if a
router is not on site, there is no possibility of implementing hybrid private peering.
57






In some cases, hybrid private peering was either unavailable or it introduced other problems.
For example, if a given ISP had several direct cross connects to other ISPs at the NAP, in addition
to other connections to other ISPs over the normal NAP infrastructure, traffic levels could increase
so much that the leased line from the ISP's backbone to the NAP could become over utilized. As
previously discussed, over utilization on any network component can lead to increased latency
through that device, and eventually to packet loss as interface queues fill up.
Large ISPs began to interconnect privately over direct circuits (in contrast to shared switches)
in places mutually convenient for each other. Such private circuits provide several benefits. First,
they are often faster than the congested NAPs. Second, as there is no third party provider of the
interconnection fabric, operations (maintenance, repair, troubleshooting, etc.) are simpler. Also,
the two providers have more control over the peering agreement, the configurations, and the
available bandwidth.
These benefits do not necessarily come without any drawbacks. For one, the private circuits
cost more. At a public NAP, an ISP has to buy a single circuit to the NAP, but there are many
interconnections over the shared NAP infrastructure. However, with private circuits, there must be
a single line for each peer. Most peering agreements are covered by non-disclosure agreements
(NDA's) and therefore, many details regarding the legalities of the interconnection, including which
party pays for what are not known. However, in general, the cost of direct circuits between two
ISPs is shared. ISPs will generally peer in at least two locations for reasons of redundancy and in
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order to not long-haul traffic, and each of those circuits is paid for by one of the ISPs. This is one
arena in which facilities based ISPs (i.e. companies that own fiber optic networks) have a large
advantage in private peering. They are able to provision the circuits quickly and operate them at
lower costs, whereas an ISP that has to lease the circuit from a telephone company often has to wait
long periods of time for the provisioning and has to pay relatively large amounts ofmoney.
In a sense, this is a barrier for smaller ISPs to enter the private peering arena and private
peering has evolved as a "good old boys
club."59
The large providers have established private
peering with the other large providers and have effectively shut out the smaller providers from the
"good"
bandwidth. The private interconnects that offer faster transit and less packet loss can
certainly be considered
"better"
bandwidth than the bandwidth at the NAPs, where congestion
results in latency and loss.
A smaller ISP could buy transit on discrete circuits from the larger ISPs rather than peering at
the NAPs but would then have difficulty competing as a peer due to this added costs. This allows
large ISPs to exclude new entrants and smaller players because private interconnects are certainly
not offered to all comers and are not really based on any publicly disclosed criteria. Over time, it is
quite possible that this private interconnect space will be seen as anti-competitive and ultimately
collusive due to these
factors.60
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The End of "Open
Peering"
Through 1996, large ISPs generally followed "open peering
policies,"
which meant that they
would peer with other ISPs regardless of the other ISP's size, geographical presence, etc. However,
in March of 1997, UUNET Technologies announced that it planed to phase out "free of
charge"
interconnection agreements unless the other networks had substantial national investments in their
own infrastructures.
'
This was further defined as "national networks with dedicated, diversely
routed DS-3 networks, 24x7 support staff, and connections to UUNET at four or more diversely
located
locations.62"
UUNET notified its peers of the termination date for free peering, stated they
would begin to charge as of that date, and forced the other ISPs to sign non-disclosure agreements
before the negotiation of such charges could
begin.63
Around this same time, Sprint announced
similar plans to not renew
"free"
peering with certain ISPs.
Both announcements caused a major crisis in the Internet world. There were a great many
articles written by newspapers and trade journals chronicling the
issue.64
Many postulated that
Worldcom, which had recently bought UUNET, had told UUNET to make the move in order to
raise money forWorldcom, which was then suffering from heavy
debt.65
As the ISP business was
tremendously competitive, it was difficult to be profitable, and to charge ISPs that did not meet
certain criteria for interconnections would mean more potential revenue for all large ISPs. In
addition, the dispute between UUNET and Whole Earth Networks, one of the networks that had
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been notified by UUNET, eventually led to the dismissal of Whole Earth Network's then Vice
President David Holub due to Holub's public protests with UUNET66. Soon after his dismissal,
Holub posted messages to the NANOG mailing list suggesting that such peering cuts were anti
competitive and possibly illegal, and that the government had a role to play to protect public
interests by mandating interconnection requirements. This was one of the first instances of
proposed government regulation of Internet interconnections. (Holub's arguments will be discussed
in more detail in Section III.)
The consequences of UUNET's and Sprint's moves would have made it very difficult for
small to mid-size networks to stay in business competitively, as well as made it extremely tough for
a start-up to enter the market at all. Such networks would generally have been "non-facilities
based,67"
and therefore needed to lease lines from telephone companies. Having to pay for
connections to the largest networks in addition to paying for the leased lines on which their
backbones were built would make the prices they had to offer their customers rise to levels far
above those of the largest ISPs (which would not have had to pay for peering). Even such large
companies like AT&T, GTE, and Intermedia Communications, which all decided to get into the
Internet Service business a bit late, had trouble breaking into the free peering "old boys
club"
of the
big five providers (UUNET, MCI, Sprint, PSI and
ANS).68
Instead, they opted to buy CerfNet,
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Facilities-based ISPs have a telecommunications infrastructure of fiber optics, switching
equipment, etc, on which they can build their ISP business. An example is a company such as
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built an Internet backbone. Non-facilities-based ISPs are those ISPs that have to lease fiber optic
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BBN Planet, and Digex
respectively,69
all of which had previously established interconnection
agreements with the big five.
Recall also that many of the NAPs were owned by ISPs or companies that owned ISPs
-
Worldcom had purchased MFS, so it owned MAE-East and MAE-West, as well as owning
UUNET; Sprint was an ISP and owned the Sprint NAP, etc. These companies were also facilities
based corporations. By allowing the NAPs to become congested, the smaller (non- facilities based)
ISPs that were there and that had not moved to private peering due to cost issues, were now faced
with the dilemma of giving their customers spotty service over the NAPs or to pay for
interconnections to larger ISPs.
The large ISPs did try to offer some justification for why they had announced the end of free
peering for those ISPs that did not meet their newly defined criteria. John Sidgemore, president of
UUNET technologies, stated that "UUNET, MCI, and Sprint have invested a lot ofmoney in the
[Internet's] infrastructure, and a lot of others haven't. Now we have huge networks and many the
little guys want to connect to our network for free. Half our business is reselling our networks to
others."70
What Sidgemore was describing was the "free
ride"
that many felt small service providers
were after when connecting to larger providers. Take, for example, for a regional service provider
that was only connected to one NAP, and wanted to peer with a large ISP. The regional provider
would send all of their routes to the large provider, and the large provider would do likewise. The
regional provider would get a "free
ride"
across the large ISPs national infrastructure, as they would
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exchange traffic at a single NAP, where all of the regional provider's customers were, yet be able to
reach all of the large ISPs customers no matter what region they were in. There were proposed
technical solutions to this issue, such as the large ISP only announcing regional routes to the
regional service provider. However, it was technically difficult at the time and remains so today. It
is not impossible, but it is difficult to do and does not scale well with the growth of the Internet.
There was much speculation on the mailing lists NANOG and
com-priv71
about why the large
ISPs had announced their intent to stop free interconnection policies. For instance, some thought
that the large ISPs did not want to spend the necessary resources (time, maintenance, network
equipment, etc.) needed to establish interconnections with every small ISP that might come along.
The benefit for a small ISP when connecting to a large ISP is much greater for the smaller network
than for the larger. Another point that was discussed was that the large ISPs were worried the
small ISPs didn't have the technical skills necessary to properly configure and manage the
interconnection. A misconfigured interconnection between two networks can wreak havoc on one
or both networks. However, many others argued that the chance for such issues were just as great
when interconnecting with another large ISP.
There was a major backlash from many ISPs, and twelve mid-sized networks, including
GeoNet Communications, NetRail, andWhole Earth Networks, banded together to fight
UUNET.72
In order to avoid bad publicity, UUNET grandfathered in many of the complaining networks prior
arrangements of free peering, meaning those companies maintained their free of charge peering
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relationship with UUNET, while new networks that wanted to interconnect with UUNET would
have to pay.
Several such incidences have happened since then. In May of 1998, BBN Planet (bought by
GTE) told Exodus and AboveNet that they would no longer peer with them. They did not publicly
announce this, but it did come into the open on the NANOG mailing list. Again, there were many
debates on why BBN Planet would do this, what it would mean to the Internet, etc. Another such
incident occurred in October of 1996, when Digex and AGIS cut off their peering connections for
over a week, and customers ofAGIS were not able to reach web sites at Digex (which included the
Securities and Exchange Commission), and vice versa, during that
time.73
Though such incidences have occurred several times since the dissolution of the NSFNet, the
Internet has generally remained a fully interconnected network, in which all users had end-to-end
connectivity to all other users (withstanding intermittent outages). However, over time, "the
standard of openness began to slowly disappear [and] along with itmuch of the efficiency as well as




In the previous few sections, some possibly anti-competitive behaviors of large service
providers were discussed. First, facilities-based companies that owned both NAPs and ISPs had
incentives to allow the quality of the NAPs to suffer. By doing this, they were able to segment
73





Internet interconnections into good bandwidth (private leased lines) and bad bandwidth (the public
NAPs), in what could be viewed as an attempt to coerce small, non-facilities based ISPs to use
private peering instead ofpublic peering. Since in most such private interconnection arrangements,
each ISP pays for half of the private circuits, and because the facilities based ISP owns the circuits,
it is clear that the facilities based ISP gains a financial advantage. Second, several large ISPs tried
to move away from open peering, to a model in which they charged smaller ISPs for such
interconnections. Again, this move gave a financial advantage to the large ISPs, forcing smaller
ISPs to raise prices to the point where they could not compete with the large ISPs. It also made
market entry by new comers extremely difficult because they could not freely interconnect with
other ISPs, but instead had to pay for such connections.
The large service providers know that if they don't have connectivity to small ISPs, that the
large
ISPs'
customers will not notice and/or care as much as the small
ISPs'
customers would. The
small ISP has less to offer the large ISP in terms of the number of hosts the large
ISPs'
customers
would want to access. On the other hand, the small ISPs service would suffer severely without
connectivity to the large ISP, as its customers would not be able to reach large sections of the
Internet. In order for the small ISP to keep their customer base intact, they must be able to reach the
large
ISPs'
customers. In this sense, the large ISP has the upper hand in forcing the small ISP to
pay for interconnections to the large ISP. The small ISP could also chose to pay for connections to
another ISP that does have connections to the large ISP, but, in either case, they are still paying for
the connections that at one time were offered free of charge.
In the case of
UUNET'
s announcement inMay of 1997, they had announced the criteria they
would use in determining whether or not they would peer with other providers. The criteria
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included a national infrastructure ofDS3 size and the ability to interconnect with UUNET at
four
geographically distinct locations. Other large ISPs had announced similar requirements since then.
Yet many mid-sized ISPs had willingly built out their networks to meet such criteria, only to find
that the large networks still would not peer with them for one reason or another (which was never
clearly
explained).75
There were also complaints that in some cases the peering criteria were not
made publicly available to begin
with.76
Government regulation occurs when there is potential for and/or evidence of anti-competitive
behaviors. In 1 890, the Congress of the United States passed the Sherman Antitrust Act, which
declared illegal "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations."
In 1914, the
Sherman Act was amended by the Clayton Antitrust Act "to prohibit certain monopolistic practices
that were then common in finance, industry, and
trade.77"
The original interconnection model of the Internet, which was "characterized by widespread,
voluntary and non-discriminatory
interconnection,"
has begun to shift to a "hierarchical
discriminatory
model78"
in which large ISPs do not freely interconnect with all other ISPs. This
shift could lead to a
"balkanization"
of the Internet, in so far as there is a "big boys
club79"
of large
ISPs that are possibly inaccessible from non-member networks unless there is compensation from
that network to one that is a member of the club. The "big boys
club"
referred to is a group of
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several large ISPs that together have a large majority of the Internet users, and which is seen by
some as possibly acting in collusion to force smaller ISPs to pay for interconnection to the club.
A trend of recent years has been the consolidation of ISPs, thus forming larger and larger
networks. The Internet has remained competitive due to the number of companies providing
service, but the system is fragile and if a single market leader emerged that was much larger than all
the others, the stability could be in
trouble.80
Today, if a single network refused to interconnect
with others for any significant length of time, it would likely put itself out ofbusiness because all of
its customers would lose end-to-end connectivity with the rest of the Internet, and would therefore
migrate to other providers. However, if one company were able to gain enough market share such
that other companies could not provide a useful service without connecting to the
"giant"
network,
then that company could potentially use that dominate position to either take over the market or
extract payments from the smaller companies. "A network system tends towards monopolization
whenever one company has enough of the market to conduct an effective business without
interconnection with other
companies.81"
An example of a merger that could have had such an effect was the merger of MCI and
Worldcom (which owns UUNET). At the time, Internet MCI and UUNET were the two largest
ISPs, and had they been allowed to merge, could possibly have dictated peering relationships. Both
the FCC and the EU ruled that the combined entity would control too much of the Internet market
and could therefore be potentially damaging to a competitive environment. Worldcom had also
purchased CompuServe and ANS (along with several other smaller providers) and those, with the
addition of Internet MCI, were seen as creating too dominant of a player in the market. In the end,
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the Worldcom merger with MCI was approved with the stipulation that Internet MCI be divested.
Internet MCI was sold to Cable and Wireless for 1.75 billion dollars and the rest of the MCI
-
Worldcom merger moved on.
In addition to a trend of consolidation of ISPs creating potential competitive imbalances,
there is also a "concentration of control of Internet
facilities"
in which national ISPs control a
majority of the NAPs. The NAPs were first awarded to Sprint, Ameritech, Pacific Bell, and MFS,
and at that time, only Sprint had a significant ISP business. Therefore, the neutrality of the NAPs
was fairly strong. However, the neutrality of the NAPs is now in doubt, as Worldcom bought MFS
(which ran the MAE's) and UUNET, so the worlds largest ISP and the most heavily used NAPs are
now owned by one company. In addition, Pacific Bell has a strong Internet presence, as does
Ameritech. Southwestern Bell has already purchased Pacific Bell, and is in the process ofmerging
with Ameritech; therefore one company that provides significant Internet services will also own
both the Pacific Bell and AADS NAPs. When large ISPs own public NAPs, there is they have
incentive to allow the quality of the NAPs to suffer so that smaller ISPs are forced to privately peer
and/or buy transit service. Such concentration of control has also led to a hierarchy among the ISPs,
with the large ISPs at the top of the pyramid using their market power to drive the small ISPs out of
business.82
These developments and actions - namely the hierarchical discriminatory model with a
concentration of control of Internet facilities in which the large providers have the potential to force
smaller providers into paying for interconnections could be said to fall under the Sherman and
Clayton Antitrust Act, as defined above.
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The move away from such open interconnection, in which no money changes
hands
("settlement free"), to ones where certain ISPs are trying to charge for such connections, closely
resembles the interconnection agreements that are in place in the traditional telecommunications
carrier-to-carrier
connections.83
The next section will closely examine those
agreements and
compare them to what is currently in place on the Internet, and highlight why it is difficult to use
such models for the Internet.
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Section II: Telephony and Internet Interprovider Settlements
Section I explored the history of the Internet and examined how Internet interconnections
between commercial entities came into being when the single Internet backbone, the NSFNet, was
dissolved, and a multiple backbone architecture emerged. It was noted that no real consensus was
established on inter-provider interconnections, i.e., which networks should connect to each other,
which should not, and what the terms of those connections should be. This section will examine
interconnection and settlement agreements for both the traditional telephony world and the current
(mostly)
"settlement-free"
agreements in use for Internet interconnections. Telephony
arrangements are first discussed as they have evolved over a much longer time and provide
background for the Internet arrangements.
Traditional Telephony Interprovider Settlements
In the past, telecommunications providers generally interconnected to one another voluntarily
as they sought to increase their geographical coverage as well as their network
reach.84
However,
with the introduction of competition in both the long distance and local telephone service provider
market, legislative and regulatory rules that mandate carrier-to-carrier interconnection agreements
became necessary. That is because the incumbents generally do not need to interconnect to new
comers to promote geographical expansion or network reach, and in fact have revenue incentives
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not to interconnect to competition in most cases. When there is competition, the incumbent can lose
market share and therefore lose revenue. To help foster competition, regulations are often needed to
force the incumbents to interconnect with any upstarts.
Traditional Telephony Interconnection Requirements
In the United States, telecommunications companies, as mandated by the Communications
Act of 1934 (section 251a) must "interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities of other
telecommunications
carriers."85
This requirement is basically one of universal accessibility,
meaning that all communications providers are interconnected with one another in some manner
such that one providers customers can get to any other provider's customers. (This is the same
premise of end-to-end connectivity found on the Internet.) It should be noted that at this time there
is no such requirement for Internet Service Providers to interconnect, and, in theory, the lack of
such a requirement means that the Internet could segment in such a way that not all users had
universal accessibility to all others. However, in practice, this has not yet happened, mostly due to
market pressures and the demands of the installed customer base of the ISPs.
Traditional Telephony Settlements
In addition to being required to interconnect by federal mandates, common carriers have
financial
"settlements"
between them. The most general kind of such arrangements is often termed
85
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In this scheme, a
"call-minute"
is the unit used for accounting.
Internationally, when a client originates a call, the client's local service provider charges them for
the duration of the entire call. The call may pass through (transit) one or more providers before
being terminated on the remote client's local network. Most such transactions involve just two
providers, the originating and terminating ones. In this simple case, the terminating provider
charges the originating provider a per-minute cost with an accounting rate that has been
pre-
negotiated between the two parties. Both parties can charge each other depending on which one
terminates a given call. At the end of the accounting period, there are two sets of call-minutes, one
in each direction, and when there is an imbalance, the provider hosting the great number of
originating call minutes pays the other according to the negotiated rate. In more complex cases
where more than two providers are involved in the call, the settlement happens on a hop-by-hop
basis between the two networks at each hop.
Another type of settlement scheme used in international telephony interconnections, though
rare, is "sender keeps all
(SKA)."87
In this case, each service provider invoices its own clients for
the end-to-end service they are provide, but no financial settlement is made across the
interconnection structure. In a sense, SKA can be considered a boundary case of the bilateral
settlements previously described, in which both parties decide the outcome of the call accounting
process to be equal whether or not that is actually the case. Because no accounting takes place and
it is assumed balanced, no financial settlement is payable by either party.
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Another type of settlement used in the International market is
"transit,"
in which one party
invoices the other for services
provided.88
In this case, one network pays the other to provide
connectivity to the rest of the users on the network, whether they are on the other network or some
network farther down stream. This is commonly used as the basis for long distance provider to local
access provider interconnections. In a sense, this is also a boundary condition of the bilateral
settlement model, in which the parties agree to pay in only one direction.
Domestic Regulations
In the United States, there are two main types of telephony settlements in place
- access
charges and reciprocal compensation, both of which are regulated by the FCC via sections 25 1 and
252 of the Communications Act of 1934, and further amended by the Telecommunications Act of
1996.89
Both of these settlements are specific cases of the bilateral settlements as described above.
In addition to these settlement requirements, the Acts also mandate contributions to the Universal
Service Fund (section 254d). All three of these regulations warrant discussion here, as they are
currently being challenged due to the emergence of Internet access providers. These will be
discussed in more detail in section III, The Internet and Current Regulation Issues.
Access Charges
Access-charges have to do with long distance calls. For each long distance call a consumer
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telephone service providers. These fees are designed to recover the costs of the local telephone
company for the use of their facilities, and include both outgoing and incoming
calls.9,90
Reciprocal Compensation
Reciprocal has to do with local telephone calls. In this case, a local telephone company is
compensated for completing a local call that is placed by one of its competitor's customers91.
Typically, the companies involved are an incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC), which often
serves a large number of customers, and a competing local exchange carrier (CLEC) that has just
recently entered the market and therefore has fewer
subscribers.92
Universal Service Fund
The Universal Service Fund was established by the Communications Act of 1934 to subsidize
basic telecommunications services for low-income individuals and the costs associated with
bringing service to high cost rural areas93. The cost ofproviding service in urban areas is essentially
much cheaper than in rural areas due to economies of scale. (I.e. when creating the infrastructure to
support telecommunications, less money has to be spent when there are a large number of
customers in a small area than when there is a large area and a small number of customers.) The
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telephone company can service urbanites at cheaper rates than what they actually charge. The extra
monies are used to subsidize the rural users, who pay less than what it actually costs
for the
telephone company to provide them service. The FCC deemed this necessary in 1934, and still
does, so that basic telephone service can be available at low prices to all households in the United
States.
Section 254(d) of the 1934 Communications Act, as amended by the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, mandates universal service contributions from "every telecommunications carrier that
provides interstate telecommunications
services."
The 1996 Act went further and expanded
universal service such that specific beneficiaries namely schools, libraries, and rural health care
providers ~ receive federal funding to subsidize Internet access.
Telephony Settlement Trends
Both the international and domestic telephony models are by no means stable. In the United
States, for instance, there are court cases and FCC hearings on both access charges and reciprocal
compensation due to the emergence of the Internet and the access issues it has brought forth.
(These issues will be discussed in more detail in Section in.) On the international front, there is lots
ofpressure to move away from bilaterally negotiated uniform rates to separately negotiated rates in
each
direction.94
In addition, deregulation is changing the transit fee model as local providers
extend their networks into the long distance market and begin interconnection agreements with
companies in similar positions. In both domestic and international cases, there is much criticism
94
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because the negotiated rates often are not cost-based, but are instead based on a desire to create
revenue stream in the direction of the provider withmore
"power."
Current Internet Interconnection Agreements
Recall from Section I that at the time the NSF backbone was dissolved, there were no
guidelines given for when ISPs should interconnect or under what terms such interconnections
should be made. In those days, however, network operators favored network connectivity over
desires to make short-term profits. In other words, most networks were open to connect to all other
networks just to maintain end-to-end reachability of the Internet, whether or not the
interconnections made financial or architectural sense. ISPs "readily accepted and routed traffic
generated by other [ISPs} with little regard for the balance of traffic flows, network size/
geographical reach,
etc."95
That is not to say that it wasn't debated at all
- it certainly was, and quite vocally in the
Internet mailing list
"com-priv,"
which was originally established to discuss the commercialization





mailing lists. Both of these mailing lists have in the past and today continue
to shape the Internet, yet no conclusions or decisions have been drawn in all the debates. The
discussions have centered around which networks should interconnect as peers (i.e. there is no
customer - provider relationship and no money passes between the two), when there should be a
customer-provider relationship (transit), etc.
59
TransitAgreements
Transit agreements are established when there is a clear customer/provider relationship
between two networks. In such cases, a small or regional network needs to get access to the rest of
the Internet, so they pay a large provider for
"transit"
services. In such cases, the large provider
sends either a default
route96
or the entire Internet routing table to the customer network. In
addition, the large network advertises the customer's routes to the rest of the Internet. These route
announcements and traffic exchange enable the small network's customers to reach both the large
network's customers as well as the rest of the Internet. The smaller network pays the larger
network for this service based on bilaterally negotiated terms.
PeeringAgreements: SenderKeepAll (SKA)
Peering agreements are established between two networks when "both parties perceive equal
benefit from the
interconnection." 97
In such a relationship, each ISP sends their own routes and
those of their customers to the other ISP. (Note how this differs from a transit relationship, in which
a default route or the entire Internet routing table is sent. By sending only their own and their
customer routes, there is no connectivity provided to "rest of the
Internet,"
and that connectivity
must be obtained via additional interconnection relationships - either peering or transit.)
The financial arrangement used in such peering relationship is generally "bill and keep/sender
keep
all."
This means that the exchange of traffic between two ISPs occurs with no mutual charge
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- i.e. it is an interconnection agreement without financial settlements. Each ISP retains all of
then-
customer payments in full without having to settle accounts with other ISPs who participate in the
routing and delivering of that customer's traffic. This method works well when there is nearly
symmetrical traffic
flow98
and the cost of terminating the traffic is low compared to the cost of
metering it. This model has served as the primary arrangement between
"peer"
providers due to
"the administrative convenience and willingness of ISPs to promote network
connectivity."1,100
SKA works well and is most stable when both parties involved perceive equal benefit from
the
interconnection.101
In this sense, the providers must be of "equal
dimension"
in geographic
scope, customer base, traffic flow, market power, etc. - namely whatever each party perceives as
important. Each provider makes an independent assessment of the value of the interconnection, and
if each provider independently concludes that an interconnection will provide some mutual benefit,
and interconnection is made will generally remain on a stable basis. However, ifone party begins to
perceive that the relationship is no longer balanced, and that the SKA interconnection is resulting in
the leverage of their infrastructure by the other ISP, the relationship becomes unstable. (Recall the
"free-ride"
described by John Sidgemore, President ofUUNET technologies in "The End ofOpen
Peering
section."
Also recall from that section when UUNET, Sprint, and others announced the end
of "free
peering"
(a.k.a. SKA). It was because they began to perceive that there was no longer
balance in some of their peering relationships.)
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It should be stressed that the essential criteria for a stable SKA relationship is the perceived
equality that the networks achieve by interconnecting on a settlement free basis. This is a subjective
evaluation that each ISP must make for each established and potential interconnection relationship.
Because it is subjective, each ISP is likely to come up with their own set ofpeering criteria that they
use to evaluate other ISPs before entering a peering agreement. Since no money changes hands, if
either IPS feels there is an imbalance in anyway, they may feel that the other network is cheating
them. Due to this, some have suggested that money should flow towards the ISP that is providing
greater value - i.e., they want to establish settlement-based interconnections. However, because
the determination of relative value is strictly subjective, determining which direction the money
should flow is a controversial topic. In addition, there are many issues with determining a fair
settlement mechanism on the Internet, as described in the next section.
Problems with Settlements on the Internet: What could be the
"call-minute?"
Over time, ISPs have appeared more inclined to interconnect facilities only if a transfer of
payment occurs, and slowly the Internet is becoming more like a system of telephone company
networks.102
However, there are many problems with treating Internet interconnections and
telephony interconnections similarly. Perhaps the biggest stumbling block is determining a fair
accounting unit. With telephony, a call minute is the standard unit and is simple to account for;
however, on the Internet there is no such simple accounting unit to available to use. This section





One proposed equivalent to the
"call-minutes"
used in telephony settlement arrangements is
TCP/IP packets. Packets are at the heart of all Internet traffic - everything that crosses the Internet
does so as packets. Recall that with telephony settlements, the terminating provider charges the
originating provider a per-minute cost with a prescribed accounting rate. Therefore, with packets as
the unit of accounting, the network receiving the packet would charge the network that originated
the packet. Packets flow both ways in each individual session that crosses the interconnection
boundary. At the end of the accounting period, the network that received more packets than it sent
would receive a settlement payment from the other network.
There are many problems associated with using packets as the call-minute. First, it is
extremely difficult to keep precise measurements of packets in the core of the Internet due to the
tremendous volumes of traffic. Current Internet technology, which includes hardware such as
routers and switches and the software that runs those, has not been designed for such accounting
purpose and therefore has difficulty doing it without causing resource strains on the equipment.
Also network outages, data collection failures, etc., can make it difficult to keep accurate records.
Second, this method is open to abuse as bogus traffic can be created in either direction to skew the
balance of traffic flow, and such bogus traffic is very difficult for either party to notice.
Session flows?
Another proposed accounting unit is for session flows. Each TCP session can be considered




gatherers, such as Cisco's NetFlow103. By measuring session flows in this manner, the actual
settlement structure could be based on the duration of the flow (similar to telephony's call minutes)
or traffic volume of the flow.
There are also issues with this method. First, not all traffic on the Internet is part of a TCP
flow. There is also the UDP protocol, which has no real session characteristics., as there is no
acknowledgement from the receiver to the originator, etc. However, for UDP traffic, there could
be some type of accounting against the source of the packets. There is also the same issue of
technology that was discussed with packet accounting
-
namely that the current Internet technology
was not built for such accounting, and that it is extremely difficult to do such accounting in the core
of the Internet due to the tremendous number of concurrent sessions over a single exchange point at
any given time. Finally, there are issues with asymmetric routing, in which it would not be
possible to see both sides of the flow from one exchange point.
Traffic volumes?
Another proposed accounting unit is traffic volume. In this scenario, the volume of traffic
passed in each direction across the interconnection point would be measured, and at the end of each
accounting period, the two ISPs would financially settle with each other at their agreed upon rate as
applied to the net traffic flow. However, which way the money would flow is not entirely obvious.
One possible model is that the origination network should be funding the terminating provider to
deliver the traffic, and therefore the money flows in the same direction as the traffic. However,
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another model assumes that the overall majority of traffic is generated in response to actions of the
receiver (i.e. a web page request, a request to transfer a file, etc.). In this case, the terminating
provider would pay the originating provider. (These two different views will be explored in more
detail in the next section, "DefiningWho has Value.")
Accounting based on traffic volumes has some of the same problems as packet counting and
flow accounting. In the case of traffic volume, it is much easier to measure than the others (and in
fact is currently done by most every provider on their interconnections to measure utilization for
capacity planning reasons). However, this is also open to abuse, as it is easy to create bogus traffic
to shift the revenue to a given network. "Overt abuse is often easy to detect, but greed is a
wonderful stimulate to ingenuity and more subtle forms of abuse could
follow."104
Also, third




Defining who has Value
As seen above, the view different people take on which network provides value to the other is
not always clear. For any two ISPs that interconnect with each other, the decision as to which one
should assume the role of upstream provider and which should assume the role of downstream
provider is not always easy to determine for either party, or even to an outsider for that matter. The
question becomes "can an objective determination be made ofwhether an ISP is a peer to or a client
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In many cases, it appears that the question is not even appropriate because the
role of client and provider can change in various instances. However, it is a critical question,
because if a completely objective determination cannot be made, then question becomes "who is
responsible formaking a subjective determination, and on what
basis?"107
It is interesting to note that such value issues were discussed as early as March of 1990, at the
conference held for discussions of the "Commercialization of the
Internet,"
as documented in RFC
1 192, "Commercialization of the Internet Summary
Report."108
At that conference, it was noted
that the large networks of the time, namely CSNET, BITNET, UUNET, PSI etc., were using the
NSFNet backbone for free, so it appeared they were enjoying a subsidy from the NSF, Merit, IBM,
andMCI, the four entities that were funding the NSFNet. However, they generally added their own
value to the nascent Internet as all users benefited from access to each other's users and resources.
It was also noted that many small or startup networks generally brought in less resources, so they
may have benefited more from their connections than the other parties. And finally, the conference
touched on traffic asymmetry issues. For example, three times more traffic flowed from the Internet
to MCLMAIL than from MCEVLAIL to the Internet. At the time, there was a sender-pays fee
structure to MCEVLAIL such that the sender had to pay for mail to be delivered. Therefore, the
network originating more mail had to pay the other network. However, today, there are no
settlements for peering, and therefore money does not transfer between the two peering networks..
Some feel that such large imbalances in traffic flow are inherently not fair if not money changes
hands.
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The Internet has evolved with three main types of ISPs: those that are dial-centric, meaning
most of their customers use the ISP as a dial connection to the Internet, those that are Web-centric,
meaning most of their customers host content on web pages on the Internet, and those that are
business oriented, in which the majority of their customers are businesses that purchase leased lines
from the ISP to access the Internet. The client-server architecture of the Internet leads to
asymmetric traffic flows. When a user requests a web page, they send a relatively small packet to
the web page's server, and that server sends the entire web page back to the requester generally in
many larger packets. As multi-media rich web pages have become the standard web fair, large
amounts of data are sent back to the requester. The same is true for file transfers. A user sends a
few small packets to request what may be very large file. The resulting imbalance in traffic flows
for such sessions can be anywhere from 3 to 1 to 1 5 to 1 . This asymmetry is beyond anything
reasonable, and with every new generation of Internet applications, from email, to FTP, to WWW,
to streaming media (such as RealAudio/RealVideo), the traffic asymmetries from requester to
sender have become larger.
The asymmetries can sometimes be in the reverse direction. For example, an email sender is
the session requester, and if they have attached large files to the email, then the requester is sending
more data to the receiver than the receiver to the sender. This is the opposite ofwhat happens for the
common Internet applications ofHTTP (web browsing), FTP (file transfer), and streaming media,
but does show that no assumptions about traffic symmetry are valid for all types of traffic that can
be found on the Internet.
So the question of who provides value to whom is controversial. Is the value provided from
the web-centric ISP for having all the content, or is the value provided by the dial-centric ISP for
having the users that want to access the content. It is also
apparent that measurements such as
greater customer base or greater geographic coverage have little to no meaning. For instance, if one
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ISP has 10,000 users, and one has ten, which one would be expected to gain the most by
interconnection to the other? If those 10,000 users of the first ISP are all dial users, and those ten
customers of the second ISP are the largest ten Web sites on the Internet, is it even possible to
define?
The costs associated with dealing with a content centric service provider can be quite
significant. The Internet evolved with "hot
potato"
routing, or "shortest exit
routing."
This means
that traffic from network A to network B is sent to network B at A's closest connection to B, no
matter where the final destination in network B may be. The Internet evolved this way, in part,
because it saves the sending ISP costs in terms of network infrastructure. What this means for
content-centric providers is that wherever their data centers are, they dump traffic to the requester at
the point closest to the data center that they can. As the session flow is asymmetrical, in the sense
that the requestor sends very little traffic to the server while the server sends lots of traffic back to
the requester (for most types of traffic), it is the requester's network that needs the large





benefits the web-centric provider the most in terms of the cost ofnetwork infrastructure build out.




routing, in which the content centric
provider would carry the traffic on their own network to the interconnection point nearest the
requestor, but there are some issues with this. Longest exit routing is accomplished by setting the
BGP109
knob Multi Exit Discriminator (MED) on route announcements. For example, if network
A peers with network B on both the East and West coasts, network A can mark all routes that are
"near"
the East coast with a low MED on the interconnection point on the East coast, and mark
those same East coast routes with a highMED on theWest coast interconnection point. In this way,
109
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network A is able to give network B some information about where the final destination is on
network A. See Diagram 8 for an example.
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Diagram 8: Network A peers with Network B on both the East and West coasts. The route
prefix x.y.z.0/24 is connected to Network A's San Francisco node, so network A advertises that
route to Network B with a lower MED on the West coast than on the East Coast. Network B will







One problem with this method is that as the Internet routing tables were growing at an
exponential rate, route aggregation became necessary to keep the routers stable. Aggregation
means taking networks that are numerically next to each other and announcing them as one route.
For example, if a given provider owns traditional class C networks 200.100.1.0 255.255.255.0 and
200.100.2.0 255.255.255.0, which are expressed in Classless Inter-Domain Routing [CIDR] format
as 200.100.1.0/24 and 200.100.2.0/24, they can announce one route that covers those two:
200.100.1.0/23. Often, as ISPs evolved, address allocation was not done in a hierarchical or
geographical fashion. In the example above, the ISP may have used 200.100.1.0/24 on the East
Coast and 200.100.2.0/24 on the West Coast. Therefore, if they are now advertising
200.100.1.0/23, assigning a MED to differentiate approximate location makes no sense. The only
solution would be to send the more specific /24's, which eliminates the desired benefits of CIDR -
namely reducing the size of the Internet route table. Therefore, that solution does not scale well, as
the Internet route tables could grow too large for the routers to handle.
It should be noted that some content-centric providers, such as AboveNet, Frontier Global
Center, etc. will listen to MEDs to help bear the cost of the network infrastructure needed to serve
their customer's content to the requestors. But not all networks are able to provide meaningful
MEDs per above, and again, this may not scale over the long run.
Internet Retail Cost Structure as an Impediment to Settlements
In addition to the problems of determining an acceptable accounting unit that could be used
for Internet interconnection settlements, there is another inherent problem because of the many
1 10
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different Internet retail cost structures that different ISPs incorporate. The various pricing plans
that ISPs incorporate in billing their customers makes it extremely difficult for the ISPs to
uniformly settle with each other at interconnection points.




What this means is that
for a given monthly fee, a customer is able to use the Internet as much as they want. Such a pricing
scheme makes sense during promotional periods in a nascent market when service providers are
trying to garner market share and have adequate capacity to handle the loads. During such times,
prospective customers require such incentives to stimulate their interests enough to make the up
front investment in a personal computer and an Internet access subscription. In the early days of the
network, there were fewer customers connecting to the Internet, and partially because of that there
was some excess capacity. In such times, the cost of adding another customer (i.e. carrying a bit
more traffic) is basically
negligible.112
However, over time, the billing structures have changed to reflect a growing market, and now
there is a large variety of billing methodologies. While dial up customers long enjoyed
subscription fee's of $19.95 for unlimited access, several of the large ISPs such as AOL, the LBM
Global Network and AT&T WorldNet have now begun to charge $19.95 for the first one hundred
hours of access, but have additional per hour usage fees beyond that. Besides the dial-up users,
business connections, ISP resale connections, and content hosting connections have evolved from
flat rate pricing to various different billing models. Some are now charged on sent volume, some
111
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on received volume, some on a mix of sent and received volume, and some on the access capacity
irrespective on link
utilization.113
Given that the end user is paying their ISP for comprehensive Internet connectivity, when a
packet passes over an interconnection point, what tariffmodel should be followed? If the sender's
ISP uses a flat rate model for their customers, but the receiver's ISP uses a usage-based model,
which model should the interconnection point use? "The financial structure of interconnection
must be an abstraction of the retail models used by the two
ISPs."114
Yet because of the
heterogeneous nature of the retail models, such an abstraction is nearly impossible. If there was a
uniform retail model in which the sender of traffic pays, then client sending traffic pays the first
ISP, and that ISP pays the second ISP a tariff to deliver the packet to the destination. On the other
hand, if the uniform retail model is one in which the receiver pays, then the second ISP pays the
first ISP. But because each ISP may be billing their customer in different way, there is no uniform
retail model to apply to the interconnection.
Settlement Costs
Another important aspect of settlements is the cost associated with them. If an acceptable
accounting unit were found, it would have to be measured closely. As already stated, the current
technology in use has not been designed to do such accounting. However, if we assume that a
future generation of technology is developed that can, the costs of doing so can be analyzed. The
first cost is in the technology itself, as additional features require additional funds. However, the
costs associated with the core technology, which will be doing the normal routing of packets, etc.,
113
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may be minimal when compared to the cost of the equipment needed store, process, and analyze the
accounting data.
At some point, the overhead of such accounting may not justify the process of settlement
itself. For example, if it costs network A $10 to determine that it owes network B $100, and it costs
network B $10 to determine that it owes network A $105, network B would need to pay network A
$5. Yet it took network A and network B $20 to figure that out. In the telephony market, these
charges were tiny compared to what the customer paid in per minute
charges.115
However, a recent
RAND study concluded that 90% of the cost of telecommunications goes towards billing and
accounting (i.e. not just the billing department, but the network architecture that permits the
billing) . The telephony network evolved over many years to incorporate the billing mechanisms,
but the Internet has evolved over a relatively short period of time with no such mechanisms
included, and at this point in its development, it could potentially cost more money in terms of
technology to do such billing than the money that would be generated if it were actually done.
Before moving on to look at the current interconnection arrangements of the Internet, one
further point bears discussion. In the telephony world, the
"calls"
are very homogenous to the
network, in that a circuit of 64kbps is established between the caller and the receiver for the
duration of the call. Because of this, it is difficult, if not impossible, for one provider to try to
fraudulently adjust the accounting scales in their favor. However, on the Internet the traffic is very
heterogeneous, in that whatever accounting unit was decided upon for settlements, it would be very
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would shift the revenues in one direction or another could easily be generated yet would be difficult
to detect and trace. In addition, when an ISP is richly interconnected with many others ISPs and
there are settlements involved in those interconnections, the primary objective ofa routing policy no
longer would be to support optimal network connectivity, but instead would be policy with a
primary objective ofmaximizing financial returns to the
network.117
Comparing and Contrasting Telephony versus Internet Settlements
At this point the major similarities and differences between traditional telephony
interconnections and settlements and those of Internet Service Providers will be reviewed. One
major difference is that telecommunications carriers are required by government regulation to
interconnect with one another as a way to ensure universal access to all customers of all providers.
For ISPs, there is no such requirement mandated by government regulations, and thus far market
pressures have forced ISPs to remain interconnected to ensure such universal end-to-end
connectivity. There could be a time when the market is not able to force this, at which time the
governmentmay need to step in for the good of the public.
Another difference is that telecommunications carriers have financial settlements between
them, based on the accounting unit of "call
minutes."
With traditional voice services, a voice circuit
is established from end-to-end and the duration of the call is measured. The network that
terminates the call charges the network that originates the call, and because calls generally flow in
both directions, the net difference in call minutes is determined with the network that terminates
more call minutes receiving payment from the network that originates
the calls. For ISPs, transit
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relationships involve one ISP paying another for carrying their customers traffic to the Internet and
is generally used when there is a clear customer-provider relationship. Peering relationships, on the
other hand, are between ISPs of "similar
size"
(as perceived by each ISP) and there are no financial
settlements. Settlements are troublesome for the Internet for several reasons, including the non
existence of a usable accounting unit (e.g. the call-minute of carrier-to-carrier interconnections), the
fact that there has been no objective way to determine who provides more value in the relationship,
and the fact that Internet traffic flows are much more heterogeneous than telephony calls which
makes it easier to fraudulently shift the accounting in one networks favor.
Telephony financial settlements derived from a different set of initial premises than those that
fit the Internet, as described by GeoffHuston and paraphrased
here.118
The typical starting point for
carrier-to-carrier settlements is that the retail offering of the provider is one of a comprehensive,
end-to-end service, in which the originating service provider utilizes the services of other providers
to complete the delivery of the service. The originating provider then settles with those other
providers who have taken some kind of role in providing the service. With such cost-distribution,
both small and large providers are able to operate with some degree of financial stability, which in
turn allows a competitive market to exist. However, the retail model of the Internet is not
necessarily one of end-to-end service, but one of partial path service. And there is no price
component that covers the complete path. "In an abstract sense, the Internet can be viewed as a
collection ofbilaterally funded path pairs, where the sender funds the initial path component and the
receiver funds the second terminating
component."
118








It is interesting to note that Internet interconnections of the non-transit relationship
type have
begun to raise the same questions of access, equity, and pricing of local and
inter-exchange earner




and have therefore not been subject to regulation. Such regulatory issues are
covered in the next section.
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Section III: Internet Interconnections and Regulatory Issues
Section I of this thesis explored the history and development of Internet interconnections and
highlighted some possible anti-competitive behaviors of certain ISPs in this arena. Section U
covered traditional telephony interconnection regulations and settlements, and showed why such
settlement mechanisms are difficult to define and implement for Internet interconnections. Section
III will explore the history of FCC regulations concerning information services and cover topics
that, while not directly related to Internet interconnections, show that the Internet is forcing the FCC
to re-evaluate many of its current regulations relating to information services. The similarity of
these issues with respect to ISP interconnections shows that the government has an interest in the
continued growth and proliferation of the Internet, which could be hurt by anti-competitive actions
regarding such interconnections.
History of Information Services Regulation
Over the years, the FCC has generally taken a "no
regulation"
stance with regards to data
services over traditional telecommunications infrastructures. This section gives a brief review of
the FCC decisions relating to information services as described by Computer Inquiries I, II, and III
below. These inquiries were FCC investigations of and decisions on how computer related services
over the telephone network should be handled.
Computer Inquiry I: Data ServiceNotRegulated
In the Computer Inquiry I proceeding, which opened in 1966, the FCC requested comments
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on the "interdependence of computers and communications
services.120"
The Commission issued a
final decision in March of 1971, which addressed two important questions: (1) are computer data
processing service providers subject to common carrier regulation; and (2) should common carriers
that provide data processing services themselves be subject to regulations that prevent them from
discriminating against competing data service providers?
For the first question, the FCC answered no, that they should not regulate computer data
processing service providers. The decision noted that while the 1934 Communications Act gave
them the authority to regulate any services offered by wire or radio, the Act also specified that the
FCC remove barriers to market entry when such barriers unlawfully restricted free enterprise.
Therefore, "data processing
activities"
were not regulated from the very early days of the industry,
and were therefore exempt from common carrier requirements of the 1934 Act.
For the second question, there were serious competitive concerns if common carriers entered
into competition with data service providers. The common carriers could unfairly compete with the
data providers because the data providers required the facilities of common carrier in order to be
able to operate. If the common carriers themselves provided such services, they would have the
ability (and incentive) to discriminate against the data provider in terms of pricing, provisioning,
etc. of the necessary facilities. Also, the common carrier could improperly cross-subsidize their
unregulated data offerings with revenues from regulated basic services. Therefore, the FCC ruled
that common carriers seeking to offer data services could do so only through a separate affiliate. In
this way, the FCC required the common carrier to serve their data service affiliate and competitors
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equally in all respects, so that the affiliate would note receive preferential provisioning, quality,
maintenance, or costs.
Computer Inquiry II: Basic vs. EnhancedService Providers:
With this proceeding, which opened in the 1970's, the FCC focused on the need for a
"workable definition of both regulated telecommunications services and unregulated data
services.1'"
The FCC issued a final ruling 1980122, which resulted in the creation of two categories






was defined as a common carrier offering of a pure "transmission capacity for the
movement of
information."
Basic service is simply basic telephone services. The term "enhanced
service"
was defined as "services offered over common carrier transmission facilities used in
interstate communications, which employ computer processing applications that act on the format,
content, code, protocol, or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; provide the
subscriber additional, different, or restructured information, or involve subscriber interaction with
stored
information."
Present day enhanced services include such things as voice messaging, alarm monitoring, and
Internet access services. Enhanced services can be thought of as basic service plus something. For
example, a voice mailbox provided by the telephone company requires the basic service of the









Also, Internet access via analogue dial requires the basic service of a phone company plus the added
services of a local ISP.
Computer Inquiry III: Removal of "separate affiliation
"
rule:
In Computer Inquiry EI, initially released by the FCC in 1986123, replaced the "separate
affiliate"
requirement of common carriers that wanted to provide data services with a model of
safeguards. This allowed common carriers to offer enhanced services that could be integrated with
basic services. Common carriers were required to unbundle the enhanced service offerings from
their basic service offerings. Note that enhanced services were still not regulated in anyway. This
decision also reiterated that common carriers had to make basic services available to enhanced
service providers at tariffed rates.
Current Regulatory Issues the Internet has Created
As seen in Computer Inquiries I, n, and III, the FCC has basically tried to not regulate any
data communications over the past 30 years. In fact, in a recent interview, current FCC Chairman
William Kennard stated "Our deregulatory posture has been in place for a long time and will stay
in place... The amazing growth of the Internet is testament to the wisdom of our deregulatory
approach.124"
However, former FCC commissioner Glen Robinson has pointed out that
competition, which the current FCC commission is trying to produce via the Telecommunications
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Act of 1996, historically has led to more regulation, not
less.125
The reason for this is that new
entrants want a particular type of deregulation that favors them, while the incumbents always feel
threatened by new technologies and claim that regulation is needed for a level playing field.
This section will explore some of the regulatory issues the Internet has created that have
received FCC attention recently. Most of these issues are not directly related to Internet
interconnections - i.e. ISP-to-ISP connections used for the exchange of routing information and
traffic. However, they are related in some way to Internet connectivity or Internet effects on
traditional telecommunication regulations, and it is useful to understand how the FCC has been
dealing with such issues to see how theymay deal with ISP-to-ISP interconnections in the future.
Reciprocal Compensation and Access Charges
Recall from Section II that reciprocal compensation is a type of bilateral settlement used
between two telecommunications providers for local telephone calls. Local telephone companies
are compensated for completing calls that are placed by one of its competitor's customers, and the
companies involved are typically the incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC) (which would have a
large customer base) and a competitive local exchange carrier (CLEC) that has recently entered the
market (and would therefore have a smaller customer base).
Reciprocal compensation had its start in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which had
many goals, one of which was to
introduce competition in the local telephone service provider
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market.126
In order to do that, a settlementmechanism for when one local network hands off traffic
to another had to be created, and that mechanism was reciprocal compensation. As the network that
originates the local call pays the network that terminates the call, money follows the traffic in the
sense that the originating network receives money from their customer, and passes some of that
money on to the terminating network to pay for that termination.
What happened because of this, though, was that the new networks (the CLECs) went after
customers that receive many calls, such as pizza delivery stores, flower shops, and especially ISP
that provide dial access services. Since the network that terminates the calls receives the settlement,
the goal is to terminate as many calls as possible, and therefore high call receivers are the desired
customers of the local providers. ISPs have modem banks that receive many, many calls. The
ILECs originally wanted the terminating network to receive the money, because, as the incumbent,
they would have had the much larger customer base and assumed that would mean they would
terminate more calls. However, as soon as the CLECs went after the customers that received a
large number of calls, the ILECs cried foul, withheld reciprocal compensation payments to the
CLECs and brought the issue before their local regulatory agencies to rule on.
Twenty-six state regulatory commissions (all that reviewed the issue) declared that a
telephone company that originates a call to an ISP
must pay the telephone company that provides
the local service to the ISP reciprocal Many of the incumbents argued that
Internet traffic is not
"local"
in nature, but should instead be considered
"inter-state"
because traffic
often begins in one state and ends in another state. Such inter-state traffic is not subject to
reciprocal compensation per FCC regulations, as it is more like long distance traffic. Long distance
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companies pay access charges to local phone companies, and when two local phone companies are
involved in carrying the call to the long distance provider, the two local companies share the access
charges paid by the long distance company and no reciprocal compensation is due. Unlike long
distance carriers, ISPs do not pay access charges to local telephone companies because ISPs are
considered "enhanced service
providers"
(ESPs), per the FCC's decision in Computer Inquiry
n.128
In that decision, the FCC concluded that ESPs were not subject to common carrier regulation and
that they did not use the local exchange network in a manner analogous to inter-exchange carriers
(ICX's) (i.e., long distance providers).
The issue of whether or not Internet calls should be considered long distance (and therefore
subject to access charges) or local (and therefore subject to reciprocal compensation) was brought
forward to the FCC in two separate proceedings. First, for access charges, in CC Docket
96-262129
issued in December of 1996, the FCC sought comments on the issue, and in May of 1997 issued
FCC 97-158130, the Access Reform Order, in which they concluded that the existing rate structure
for ISPs should remain in place (i.e. they were not required to pay interstate access charges.)
Second, the issue of whether the ILECs should pay reciprocal compensation to CLECs that sold
service to ISPs came up in February of 1999, Docket 99-3 8131, and the FCC concluded the carriers
were bound by their existing interconnection agreements and were therefore subject to reciprocal
compensation obligations to the extent of such agreements or as determined by state commissions.
The FCC declared that Internet traffic is jurisdictionally mixed in that it appears to be mostly
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interstate in nature (in which case the FCC has authority to make regulations over it), but that it was
still exempt from interstate access charges.
Robert Cannon further broke this down in a Boardwatch article as
follows:132
The FCC
analyzed Internet calls in an end-to-end fashion, and determined that no matter what happened in
the middle, the end points of the call were all that mattered. In other words, an end users starts a
call and terminates it at the Internet destination the user is accessing, and the elements in the middle,
such as the ISP, router, upstream providers, DNS servers, etc., are incidental to the complete
transmission. Such communications were deemed to be a mix of inter- and intra- state
communications, for which the FCC has no rules to deal with. In the absence of any rule, the FCC
declared that "the local telephone companies had
'voluntarily'
included this type of traffic within
their interconnection and reciprocal compensation
agreements,"
and therefore the FCC would not
interfere.
It should be noted at this point that this whole issue was the heart of the now infamous
"modem
tax"
rumor, in that if the ILECs were allowed to treat the ISPs as IXCs and therefore be
able to charge per minute access-charges, the ISPs would have to in turn disband the common flat-
rate dial pricing scheme generally offered to Internet end users, and instead charge per-minute fees
to connect. However, as can be see from the previous discussion, that was never the real reason
this was brought forward to the FCC. It was instead an attempt by the ILECs to stop paying
reciprocal compensation to CLECs for Internet calls.
Twenty-six states had already decided that reciprocal compensation was due, and the FCC, by




decisions. So Internet calls are
considered local in the sense that reciprocal compensation is required, but are considered inter-state
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yet fall under the enhanced service provider umbrella such that access charges are not required.
This is a prime example where historical and/or current regulations and definitions do not fit the
rapidly changing environment of telecommunications, and therefore rule-making decisions on
Internet issues is very difficult. As such, the FCC has initiated a rule making proceeding to
determine how ISP bound traffic will be
handled.133
As part of the request for comments on a rule-making procedure, the commission also
tentatively concluded that commercial negotiations are the ideal means for establishing the terms of
interconnection contracts (reciprocal compensation in particular) with two
proposals.134
The first
proposal is that "commercial negotiations are the ideal means of establishing the terms of
interconnection
agreements."
The second proposal is that the "FCC would adapt a set of federal
rules governing inter-carrier compensation for ISP bound traffic, pursuant to which both parties
would engage in negotiations concerning rates, terms, and conditions applicable to delivery of
interstate ISP-bound
traffic."
The main difference between the two proposals is that in the first,
the states are the arbiter, while in the second, the FCC can become the arbiter based on their
predetermined rules. Under either proposal, the negotiation takes place between the two parties,
and if there is any dispute, it can be resolved by either the state regulatory agency (in proposal one),
or the FCC (in proposal two).
The first proposal is basically the status quo between ILECs and CLECs today. Note that it is




negotiate such that neither ISP
pays the other, though that is not always the case, and in the case of
"transit"
the two ISPs negotiate
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a rate based on a customer-provider relationship. In the second proposal, however, the FCC is




traffic is handled in terms of the ILEC
to CLEC hand-off. In this case, the rules are for the local loop to the CLEC that provides the ISP
local service, so it is different than ISP to ISP interconnections in terms of
"peering,"
but the jump
from one interconnection type to the other may not be that difficult for the FCC to make. Leaving
the establishment of inter-carrier compensation frameworks to private contractual negotiations
between RBOCs and their competitors has failed
miserably,135
as seen in the preceding discussion
of regulatory proceedings. The same can also be said about ISP-to-ISP interconnections, and itmay
not be long before they too are brought before the FCC as regulatory proceedings. As the FCC has
proposed either state regulatory agency or the FCC itself become the final arbiter in ILEC to
CLEC issues, it may at some point do the same in ISP-to-ISP issues.
Section 271 and 706 of the Telecommunications Act
RBOCs are currently prohibited by section 271 (b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
from providing services within their own regions that extend beyond their local access transport
areas (LATAs)136. This prohibition was established when AT&T was dissolved into separate
companies in the early 1980's, and was established to prevent the RBOCs from providing long
distance services. The RBOCs had been created specifically to provide local services, leaving
AT&T and its competitors to provide long distance services. However, in light of the current Act's
goal of more competition through deregulation, the RBOCs are now permitted to provide long
distance services and any other services that extend beyond their own LATA's providing they met
135
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certain prescribed criteria. The Act includes a 14-point "competitive
entry"
checklist that the
RBOCs must pass before the FCC will grant approval for such services which includes such things
as the following:
interconnection with local competitors as defined by section 25 l(c )(1) and 252(d)(2) (i)
non-discriminatory access to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights of way for local
competitors (iii)
unbundling of the local loop (iv)
reciprocal compensation agreements as required by section 252(d)(2) (xiii)
(The Roman numeral in parentheses following the list entry is the number in the Act's 14-point
checklist.) The list goes on, but these four items are the main clauses relating to interconnections
and settlements. Although not necessarily the same kind of interconnection and settlement issues
involved in ISP-to-ISP communications, these do indicate that the FCC has an interest in regulating
interconnections and settlement mechanisms between competitors in the local market.
The other aspect of this regulation that is more directly related to Internet interconnections is
the fact that RBOCs cannot provide data services (e.g. Internet services) between LATAs, which
basically translates to "RBOCs can not develop national backbone infrastructures for providing
Internet
services."
Instead, the RBOCs are forced to buy transit connections from national
providers in order to get full Internet connectivity to provide end-to-end service for their customers.
The RBOCs have tried various avenues to get around this checklist in order to provider
inter-
LATA services, including data services, such that they could build national backbones. In "The
Need for Facilities-Based Internet Backbone
Competition,137"
which was authored by Robert
137





Gibson but sponsored by the RBOCs under petition of section 706 of the Telecommunications
ACT, "seeks regulatory authority from the FCC to deploy regional Internet backbones, i.e.
broadband inter-LATA data
services."
Section 706 of the Act states "The Commission and each
State commission with regulatory jurisdiction over telecommunications services shall encourage the
deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans. . .
"
Gibson covers much of the same ground that this thesis has covered to this point
-
namely the potentially anti-competitive behaviors, concentration of control of facilities such as
NAPs, and the fast consolidation of ISPs through corporate buyouts and mergers - in addition to
section 706, in order to petition the FCC to override the restriction placed on RBOCs of offering
inter-LATA services. Gibson's main point is that by allowing the RBOCs to offer inter-LATA data
services, which in effect would allow traffic to flow between an RBOCs local service areas without
first having to pass through a national ISP, would provide faster local services and more
competition in the Internet access market.
Such complaints have not fallen on deaf ears within Congress. In the "Internet Freedom Act
of
1999,139"
Senators Boucher and Goodlatte have proposed lifting such inter-LATA restrictions.
This proposed Act states "the FCC is currently ignoring its responsibility under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 to provide regulatory relief to incumbent phone companies
[RBOCs] by removing existing regulations on data traffic. Existing suppliers of Internet backbones
are simply unable to keep up with the demand for high-speed, high capacity backbone
bandwidth."
Section 202 ofThe Internet Freedom Act of 1999 would amend the Communications Act such that
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the restrictions of section 271 would only apply to voice traffic, thereby opening the market for
inter-LATA data service for
RBOCs.140
Note again the dichotomy between basic services (voice communications) and enhanced
services (services beyond voice which include data services). In this case, the Act of 1996 has
ignored the dichotomy in basic and enhanced services by restricting the RBOCs from providing
inter-LATA services for both voice and data, whereas the proposed "Internet Freedom Act of
1999"
would impose the dichotomy so that data services would be freed from such regulation. It is clear
that the dichotomy is causing more confusion in the current telecommunications market of rapid
change than it is relieving and that new definitions are needed.
Also note that RBOCs are currently forced into buying transit services from national
backbone providers. By lifting this regulation and allowing RBOCs to build national their own
Internet backbone infrastructures, the RBOCs could potentially negotiate settlement free peering
with other national providers, and therefore add more competition to the market. Again, these
proposed changes in current regulations shows that ISP-to-ISP interconnections are at the fore of
government concerns, whichmay mean such connections are regulated in the future.
Common Carrier Status
Soon after the first announcements by large ISPs such as UUNET and Sprint that they would
terminate their "free
peering"
agreements with smaller networks (see Section I, "The End of Open
Peering") many people began suggesting that ISPs should be required to interconnect to one
another. Common carriers (traditional telephony service providers) are required to interconnect
140
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with each other, per section 251 (a) of the Communications Act of 1934. However, ISPs are not
required to interconnect with each other, which stems semantically from the fact that they are not
considered common carriers141.
Recall from section I, that David Holub lost his job as vice president of Whole Earth
Networks over the dispute caused by
UUNET'
s announcement of their intent to end free peering
relationships with smaller networks. Soon after, Holub posted his arguments as to why ISPs should
be regulated by the government to interconnect. These posting were the among the first arguments
that state ISPs should apply for common carrier status so that interconnections would be required by
government regulation. Holub's argument follows the following
reasoning:142
Universal
reachability is a fundamental tenet for all public networks. The assumption is that a customer who
pays for a connection to a public network will receive connectivity to all points on that network.
This is true and has been required of the traditional telephony network, and it is assumed to be true
of the Internet. As these Internet is not a single entity, but instead comprised ofmany networks that
connect together, there must be interconnection requirements in order to keep the assumption of
universal reachability in tact.
Holub went on to argue that ISP-to-ISP interconnections should be classified as basic
telecommunications rather than enhanced services, such that Internet interconnections would be
required under section 25 1 (a) of the Communications Act. To this end, he went so far as lobbying
for common carrier status for his ISP Whole Earth Networks (before he was fired) in order to
ensure interconnections with other providers. In this regard, Holub was a pioneer on this front as
http://www.house.gov/goodlatte/sectsum.htm
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this argument is still used today. However, the FCC has yet to decide that Internet traffic is basic a
basic telecommunication service, so it still lives under the umbrella of enhanced services and is
therefore not subject to regulation. Therefore, ISP interconnections are not a requirement, and to
date have only been held together by market pressure. However, if the tenet that universal
reachability is fundamental to the Internet were true, then it would seem that ISP-to-ISP
interconnections should be enforced by something stronger than justmarket demands.
"Last
Mile"
Open Access: RBOCs and Cable (or xDSL and Cable)
The "last
mile"
- the wire that connects individual residences to either the local telephone or
cable network, has been a very hot issue over the past few years. There is currently a strong push
by service providers to install broadband bandwidth to the home because the demands of using the
Internet effectively have continued to rise. In the past, the lastmile has typically been provided by
a monopolistic
company143
- the RBOC for the copper wire used for local telephone service and the
cable company for cable television service. RBOCs are scrambling to provide broadband
bandwidth over Digital Subscriber Loops (DSL) while cable providers have been just as busy trying
to provide broadband bandwidth over cable modems. The RBOCs have been traditionally forced
by federal regulations to provide "open
access"
to their facilities to CLECs144, whereas cable
companies have not been subject to the same open access requirements. This section will examine
the regulatory issues the Internet brought forth in this area.
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 had a primary goal of increasing competition such that
consumers would benefit by lower prices and increased access to new services. It could indirectly
accomplish this by (ironically) decreasing the number of communications companies by allowing
mergers of large companies with traditionally different services (i.e. AT&T, a telephone company,
buying TCI, a cable
provider).145
The Act deliberately relaxed limits on multiple ownerships
(restrictions on how many different services a single company could provide) and entry into various
markets so that such competition creating consolidation could occur.
Until recently, RBOCs were required by the Communications Act of 1996 to unbundle
network elements to CLECs, such that the CLECs could effectively sell local services at rates that
allowed them to be competitive with the RBOCs. However, on September 15th, 1999, the FCC
issued an
order146
that revised the Act's original order. Much of this new order dealt with
traditional telephony related issues, for which six of the original seven network elements must still
be unbundled, but one part of it dealt directly with broadband access to the Internet. The
Commission declared that, except in limited situations, the ILECs were not required to unbundle the
facilities used to provide high-speed Internet access and other data services - specifically noting
packet switches and digital subscriber line access multiplexers (DSLAMs). The order stated
"given the nascent nature of this market and the desire of the Commission to do nothing to
discourage the rapid deployment of advanced services, the Commission declined to impose an
obligation on incumbents to provide unbundled access.
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This order effectively put RBOCs and cable companies on equal ground. Until this order,
RBOCs were required to unbundle components used for high speed Internet access, whereas cable
companies that were offering high-speed access over cable modems were not. This had been seen
as a situation that was fostering anti-competitive behaviors by cable companies, in that they could
provide high speed Internet access over cable but other ISPs in the same geographic area could not.
Before this order was issued, the ILECs had been making it extremely difficult for CLECs to gain
access to such services by "dragging their
feet"
in following the regulations imposed by the Act and
fighting the open access requirement for high speed Internet access148.
In addition, cable companies had refused to open up their facilities to competitors on the
grounds that they had paid for the upgrades necessary to the cable plant to provide such services,
and that they would discontinue the upgrades if they were forced to share the facilities. John
Petrillo, executive vice president of AT&T summed this sentiment up: "don't make us open our
cable network to competing ISPs. We'll just stop offering our data services instead, because we
can't justify the billions of dollars it would require to upgrade the cable network ifwe had to share
it with others. After we've built the infrastructure and we're up and running, society can then
decide whether it would be best to open our network to others - but not
now.149"
However,
competitors claimed that by the that time, the cable companies would have had an unfair advantage
in building a huge customer base, and that those customers would not likely quickly switch over to
the new competition once they were allowed to share the infrastructure.
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The OpenNET Coalition is a group of ISPs and other interested parties that have banded
together to fight for the unbundling of cable companies high-speed data networks, which would
allow ISPs other than the cable companies to provide Internet services over the cable plant. They
are now likely to fight the FCC's recently declared order to not force ILECs to unbundle similar
high-speed data network equipment. When AT&T purchased TCI, each local community had to
approve the local cable license transfer. Several communities, including Fremont, CA, Broward
County, FL, and Portland, OR, declared that AT&T would have to open their cable plant to
competitors. The FCC has taken the stand that such community based regulations may have good
intentions but are bad regulations: "Establishing a world where each local community can set the
technical standards ... dooms the Internets lofty goals to
failure.150"
This follows the FCC's
sentiments from two separate proceedings earlier in 1999, in which the FCC stated "The market, not
the government, should bring broadband to all
Americans.151"
As can be seen by the proceeding discussion, it is apparent that the FCC is trying to maintain
their position of the
"unregulation"
of the Internet, by not forcing ILECs and cable companies to
open their facilities to competitors. While this seems to go against their stated goals of fostering
competition, in some senses it is not. As both ILECs and cable companies dragged their feet in
opening access to others, the deployment rate of high-speed advanced services was slow. The FCC
has taken the stance that there is competition between the RBOCs and the cable companies giving
consumers a choice for broadband providers and has therefore not declared that both must open
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In what can be considered an attempted reversal of the government's stance, Senator Bob
Goodlatte has introduced the Internet Freedom Act of
1999.152
Section 101 of this proposed Act would:
"ensure competition among providers of high speed Internet service by
requiring that incumbent local telephone companies provide conditioned
unbundled local loops as provided by the Telecommunications Act of 1996
when economically reasonable and technically
feasible."
In addition, section 102 states the following:
"would ensure that other broadband access transport providers, in addition to
incumbent local telephone companies, allow broadband Internet service
providers to compete fairly over their
facilities."
Finally, section 103 states the following:
"it shall be unlawful for a broadband Internet transport provider to engage in
unfairmethods of competition or unfair deceptive trade practices, the purpose or
effect of which is to discriminate in favor of a service provider associated with
that transport provider or restrain unreasonably the ability of a service provider
not affiliated with a broadband Internet access transport provider to compete in
its provision of Internet
services."
Whereas the FCC has stepped back on the unbundling of high-speed local access equipment,
the Internet Freedom Act is actually pushing forward the regulation of such unbundling
requirements. It appears that the FCC is trying to speed the deployment of broadband Internet, by
152
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not forcing the owners of such facilities to share those facilities, as those owners have stated they
would simply not build it if they were required to sink all the money into the infrastructure just to
have to share it. On the other hand, Congress is trying to foster competition in broadband Internet
access by forcing the owners/builders of the infrastructure to share it with others.
For both the FCC and Congress, it is clear that the U.S. government has an interest in both the
deployment of the Internet and competition in providing access to the Internet. In this "last
mile"
issue, there is a fight to ensure broadband access is built and ensure that there is competition without
anti-competitive behaviors. These are the same issues that ISP-to-ISP interconnections face today
-
namely apparent anti-competitive behaviors, the need to deploy the services at fast rates, and true
competition. It is clear that the FCC and Congress are very interested in such areas and are
watching them closely to ensure true competition and fast build out. Therefore, it is likely that if
any behavior in the area of ISP-to-ISP interconnections goes against this grain, the FCC would
likely intervene.
Convergence and its Effects on "Enhanced
Services"
and the Universal Service Fund
In the past several years, the telecommunications industry has seen a tremendous
consolidation in terms of company acquisitions and mergers in which the two parties have
traditionally offered vastly different services. The AT&T acquisition of TCI is just one such
example, in which a traditional telephony service provider purchased a cable television service
provider. The reason for this is that what were once disparate services are converging onto a single
network. AT&T wants to provide local telephone service, cable television service, and broadband
Internet access all over a single
"wire"
into the home. Other examples in which differing
telecommunications service companies have merged/been acquired are AOL/ Teleport and US
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West/Cablevision (which became Media
One).153
Such mergers have been the result of
telecommunications deregulation and are leading to the fact that telecommunications services are




In addition, IP telephony over the Internet is growing at a tremendous rate, as
Internet speeds continue to grow and the quality of such connections improves.
The various telecommunications networks, including the telephony network, the cable
television network, and the Internet, all have the foundation to merge or become indistinguishable
from each
other.155
The Internet has the capacity and versatility to become a one-size-fits-all
transmission and information services medium. In other words, as the content delivered over the
various networks becomes digital, it is possible for one network to carry differing services while
being transparent to the end users and/or their applications. This fact of converging media has
several consequences. For one, it makes it increasingly difficult for the FCC to determine where
telecommunications services end and information services
begin,156
which is the very heart of the
dichotomy the FCC uses to determine whether or not services are regulated. It also may have
dramatic affects on the Universal Service Fund, which was briefly described in Section II. Both of
these issues will be discussed further here.
The first issue of convergence is the FCC's distinction of telecommunications as "basic
service"
and of information services as "enhanced
service."
The FCC has used this dichotomy
since Computer Inquiries I, II, and III, in order to not regulate information services. In Computer
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Inquiry II157, the FCC defined "basic
services"
as the transmission capacity for movement of
information, or basic telephone service. Enhanced services were defined as "services offered over
common carrier transmission facilities . . . which employ computer processing applications that act
on the format, content, code, protocol, or similar aspects of the transmitted
information."
However,
with the convergence of the various networks and the types of transmissions they are able to handle,
it is becoming increasingly difficult to determine where basic telecommunications services end and
enhanced services begin. Because of this difficulty, the FCC will have to come up with new
methods for classifying services in order to help them understand whether regulations are needed or
not.
The Universal Service Fund, as described in section II, subsidizes telecommunications
services for low-income individuals as well as the costs associated with bringing services to high
cost rural areas. Currently, all providers of telecommunications services are required to contribute a
portion158
of their revenues to this fund. However, just as ISPs are exempt from access charges
(because they have been classified as enhanced service providers), they are also exempt from
contributing to the universal service fund. Because of convergence, IP telephony is becoming more
and more popular, and as the quality continues to improve, the Internet is likely to carry an
increasing amount of the voice conversations traditionally carried on the telephony network. There
are clearly financial reasons to move voice calls to the Internet.
Because the telephony network is
classified as a basic service, it is subject to regulations, including access charges, reciprocal
compensation, and universal service fund contributions. Therefore, voice calls on the telephony
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Internet calls are cheaper (in part) due to the lack of regulation, so more and more calls will migrate
to the Internet as the quality continues to
improve.159
As this happens, the USF will lose some of its
contribution base andmay begin to dry
up.160
In addition, the Communications Act of 1996 expanded the telecommunications universal
service mission to include "access to advanced telecommunications and information services ...
throughout all regions of the
Nation,"
and further expanded the beneficiaries of the fund to include
schools and libraries. The FCC further declared that Internet access was part of the
"e-rate"
telecommunications discount for schools and libraries, meaning that such institutions would be
subsidized so that they could purchase Internet access. Although individual households were not
included in Internet access subsidies via the universal service fund, the FCC did not rule this out
and it may happen as traditional services migrate to the Internet, which would make universal
access to the Internetmore important.
In fact, in April of 1998, in response to congressional direction, the FCC released a report on
the Commission's progress in implementing the universal service provisions of the 1996 Act161.
The FCC concluded that information service providers (i.e. ISPs) would not be required to make
direct contributions to the universal service fund as telecommunication carriers are required to do.
However, they also expressed discomfort with maintaining a blanket exemption on all types of
Internet telephony. "Certain phone to phone IP telephony services lack the characteristics that
would render them information services within the meaning of the statute, and instead bear the
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as defined by the Act of
1996162."
However, in this
report, the FCC did not take further action. However, their statements do show that the matter is
under consideration. RudolfGeist, writer of BoardwatchMagazine's Policy Forum, writes that at
some point the FCC "may be forced to classify all providers who use the Internet platform as
'telecommunications
carriers'
regardless of the type of service they provide, to ensure that a
significant USF contribution base
remains."163
To summarize, convergence causes two major issues. First, it will no longer be possible to
live with the dichotomy of basic service vs. enhanced service, as it is increasingly difficult to
determine where basic telecommunications services end and where enhanced information services
begin. Second, as traditionally regulated services migrate to the unregulated Internet, the Universal
Service Fund base may dry up to the point where low-income individuals and high-cost rural areas
are no longer subsidized enough to maintain telecommunications services. Finally, it must be
pointed out that as telecommunications services converge to one network, and with it looking more
and more like that one network will be the Internet, guaranteed connectivity from any point on the
network to any other point on the network is a necessary. Therefore, regulated interconnections









Section IV: The Future of Internet Interconnections
Thus far, this thesis has shown that what was once an open peering policy in which most
networks interconnected with other networks on a settlement-free basis has become more of a
hierarchical discriminatory model in which large networks try to force smaller networks into paying
for such connections. These negotiations often take place under non-disclosure agreements
(NDA's) in which the criteria for settlement free interconnections are not clearly defined by the
large ISPs. These large ISPs try to set the terms of the interconnections to what may appear to be
outside the realm ofnormal competitive pricing constraints without the natural oversight that comes
with a marketplace where essential price information is known amongst
rivals.164
The crux of the problem is how to have a competitive Internet where there can be new
entrants to the market and where smaller providers are able to innovate and introduce new products,
without hurting large networks that have invested large amounts ofmoney in their infrastructures.
This is a difficult problem to solve and most of those involved have their own opinions on how best
to do it. "It seems that everyone agrees peering needs change, and they unanimously agree that no
one is going to agree on
anything.165"
We have seen that the Internet does not easily fall into a
model of settlement-based interconnections such as that used in the traditional telephony world, and
that determining a fair settlement mechanism is not a simple task or one that is likely to be agreed
on by all involved parties.
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The evolution of public networks suggests that monopolistic abuses are commonplace unless
kept in place, either by competitive market forces or by some form of
regulation.166
To date, market
forces have been able to preserve the basic tenant of end-to-end connectivity of the Internet, but this
may not continue as mergers continue and dominant players become more dominant. Universal
reachability on the Internet is in the public interest and needs to be guaranteed in some way. This
section looks first at the possibility of industry led
"self-regulation,"




This section will explore several ways the Internet industry could potentially
"self-regulate"
itself such that government intervention does not become necessary, including open frameworks,
multi-lateral peering arrangements (MLPA's), and Mike Gaddis's proposal of the Brokered Private
Peering system. All three ideas propose ways in which negotiations for interconnections would be
made more objective rather than the current subjective state. Objective determinations would leave
no questions as to which ISPs should peer on settlement-free basis with which other ISPs and which
should interconnect in a customer-provider relationship.
Open Framework
A major problem with the current state of interconnections is that there is no open framework
on peering requirements. Large networks may have once publicized peering criteria, such as 24x7





operator coverage, connections in geographically disperse locations, and a certain size level of the
potential peer's backbone, but more often than not, such terms are now only discussed under
NDA's. Because of this, it is increasingly difficult for a small network to grow into a national tier
one network that is able to get settlement free peering with all of the major networks.
An open framework in which all networks disclosed their peering requirements could allow
all networks to have adequate information to use for decision making on peers and to better evaluate
their commercial positions relative to the
industry.167
This would also ensure to some degree that
commercial discrimination does not take place, as all networks would have the same information in
front of them when negotiating interconnection agreements.
Such an open framework could be initiated in the form of an Industry forum, which would be
more in spirit with the past evolution of the Internet (more so than government regulation). In
addition, the U.S. has tried to follow such a market led approach, and a recent White House report
entitled "A Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce168"
seeks a non-regulatory, industry led
system to govern the Internet from an international perspective as well (as opposed to government
led regulation).
The idea of an open framework could help the situation, but the likelihood of it happening
without government intervention is remote. Most large networks are happy with their current
positions when it comes to negotiating interconnection agreements. As it stands, with their
requirements not publicized and negotiations only occurring under NDA, the requirements can be
changed to meet the varying situations that occur with each discussion for every single potential
167
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interconnection. In this way, they have an advantage over every possible peer and are they are very
unlikely to give that up via a publicized open framework of requirements.
Multi-lateral PeeringAgreements
Another potential way the industry could self-govern itself is through multi-lateral peering
agreements (MLPA's). When two networks interconnect at private peering points and/or at most
NAPs, they negotiate a bi-lateral peering agreement, which is a private contract between the two
parties that defines the terms of the interconnection. As the name implies, a multi-lateral peering
agreement is a contract that defines the terms of an interconnection between multiple parties. Such
arrangements obviously only make sense at public exchange points where multiple networks can
interconnect to each other.
Some NAPs require all networks that want to participate at that NAP to sign an MLPA,
which defines the terms of the NAP connection and the interconnections that will be established. In
such cases, theMLPA may strictly require all networks to interconnect with all others that are at the
NAP, or it may define some criteria that defines which networks are required to interconnect with
which other networks. Other NAPs have MLPA's but don't require all networks that participate at
the NAP to sign it. In such cases, the MLPA may define that all networks that signed the MLPA
must peer with all others, or it may define criteria that defines which networks are required to peer
with other networks. In the case of networks that join such a NAP but don't sign an MLPA, those
networks are required to negotiate bi-lateral peering agreements (BLPA) with any other network at
the NAP with which they want to establish an interconnection.
The first example of an MLPA NAP was the Commercial Internet eXchange (CIX). Early
CLX arrangements were based on a description of the infrastructure of each party, in which
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acknowledgements ofpeer capability were based on the operation of a national transit infrastructure
of a minimum capability, but that was later changed such that payment of the CLX association
member fee would give peer
status.169
In effect, each ISP had a single agreement with the CLX
association, which in turn meant they had the ability to peer with all other associationmembers.
In almost every case, MLPA's have failed to ensure all networks interconnect to one another.
NAPs that have MLPA's often don't enforce them such that networks are free to pursue BLPA's
with those other networks that they choose to. For those NAPs that did require MLPA's, certain
networks that were not interested in being forced to peer with all others would simply not join. In
the case of the CIX, which was the first public exchange point and at one point was quite large, it
simply dwindled in size as larger providers let their contracts expire (often without implementing
necessary upgrades to prevent latency and loss!) and then pulled out. In short, MLPA's often mean
that certain networks will not participate in those NAPs as they lose the ability to privately negotiate
interconnection terms on a bi-lateral basis. Therefore, many networks feel that they lose their
advantages ofbeing able to negotiate underNDA's.
Brokered Private Peering
Michael Gaddis, former CTO of the ISP Sawis, along with contributions from ISPs Electric
Lightwave, Exodus, and Williams, has authored a white paper describing the "Brokered Private
Peering Group
(BPP)."
As defined in their words, the BPP would be "an organization dedicated to
building a lasting Internet data inter-exchange architecture built upon a sound commercial
foundation that recognizes the importance of high quality, scaleable, peer-to-peer inter-exchange
169
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bandwidth between Internet Service
Providers."170
The introduction of the white paper details
many of the same problems with peering that have been discussed in this thesis - namely that the
public exchange points have struggled to keep up with the growth of the Internet, that no
interconnection guidelines exist for which networks should peer with other networks and under
what conditions those interconnections should be made, etc. It also explains that the costs ofprivate
peering are a hindrance to smaller ISPs or those ISPs that are not facilities-based networks because
the costs present a barrier for them to enter into private peering arrangements, and are therefore
subject to the "bad
bandwidth"
at the public NAPs.
Much of the BPP proposal has to do with the formation of a scaleable ATM exchange
architecture whereby "three or more peering partners interconnect to an ATM switch in distributed
locations."171
In this architecture, there is a DS3 (minimum), OC3, or OC12 loop running multiple
virtual channels, one for each peer. It is a shared interconnect with dedicated bandwidth, at
fractional physical circuit speeds that use virtual circuits (VCs) between two peers to act as a
dedicated local loop. This architecture gives the benefits of private peering (in this case, namely
"good"
private line-like bandwidth) without local loop costs for each ISP at the exchange because
all connected networks share one large local loop, with virtual connections logically giving the
appearance of multiple direct connections. Within this framework, there are rules governing
utilization such that when a VC between two peers reaches certain levels, itmust be upgraded. This
framework is administered by the BPP group, thereby ensuring a certain level of quality throughout
the exchange. The goal of the architecture is zero packet loss, low delay, and high availability.
The architecture of the BPP exchange does help with certain issues of peering, such as the
quality of the NAPs, the responsibility of the ISPs to upgrade as needed to ensure quality, etc., but it
170




goes further than that. As we have seen, one of the main problems with interconnections is that
there are no objective criteria to determine which networks should peer with other networks, but
instead is left to the subjective views of each provider. The BPP plan goes beyond a simple
architecture and attempts to objectively define which networks must peer with each other. It
accomplishes this with a primary and secondary classification system, as described below, that
attempts to define "true
peer"
status.
The primary classification system defines three types of ISPs based on geographic coverage:
national, regional, and local. A national provider must have a national network infrastructure
(owned or leased) with the ability to provide commercial Internet access or transports to customers
coast to coast within the US, have presence and be able to sell commercial access in four of the six
BPP defined regions, have a professionally staffed Network Operations Center (NOC) that is
manned 24 hours a day 365 days a year, and have the engineering skills to operate a distributed peer
interchange with multiple providers. Regional providers are defined as not meeting the
requirements of a national provider, yet have presence in one or more of the BPP defined regions.
Local ISPs are those providers that do not meet the requirements of the national or regional
definitions.
The secondary classification places all BPP members into one of the following groups:
business access oriented, consumer dial-in access oriented, or web centric. Service providers are
defined as web centric if they send more data than they receive by a factor of three to one through
the BPP exchange point. Service providers are considered as business access oriented if it is not
web-centric and 25% of its gross revenue is from businesses or other ISPs. And finally, service
providers are considered dial-centric if they primarily sell (i.e. greater than 50% of their gross
revenue) dial-in, cable modem, and/or DSL type Internet services to consumer oriented customers.
(Note that a service provider could be classified as both business access and consumer dial-in access
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oriented under these definitions).
The BPP then goes on to defined minimum requirements for true peer status. When two
ISP's are classified as true peers, they are required by the BPP to establish interconnections. There
are three true peer groups defined, national access class, national dial-in class, and national
web-
centric class. The requirements of these groups are: national access class must have a minimum of
1000 revenue generating business access circuits at fractional Tl speeds (minimum 256Kbps) or
above, and have presence in at least one BPP exchange in all six of the BPP regions; dial-in class
must have a minimum of 300,000 revenue generating consumer dial-in (or equivalent) accounts;
web-centric must have a minimum of 200 dedicated computer web-centric host accounts that
collectively push greater than 500Mbps formore than five hours per day. When an ISP reaches true
peer status, it must establish peering relationships with other providers. Smaller ISPs who do not
meet the requirements of true peer status have the option of trying to negotiate free peering (outside
of the MLPA of the BPP), paying for peering, or buying transiting connections from other
networks.
Finally, the BPP white paper defines an
"inter-class"
true peering classification system. Here,
an ISP of "national access true peer
class"
that has the ability to peer in all six BPP peering regions
is defined to be a true peer to national dial-in and national web-centric classed providers. Similar
definitions are given for national dial-in true peers (must peer with true peers of national access
class and national web-centric class ISPs if they have the ability to peer in all six BPP regions) and
national web-centric true peers (must peer with national access class and national dial-in class true
peers if they have the ability to peer in all 6 BPP regions).
The main point of all of these classifications andmandated peering requirements is an attempt
to objectively define which providers must establish settlement
free interconnections with other
providers. There is always room for voluntary interconnections, whether on a settlement free
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arrangement or on a customer/provider relationship. This overcomes one of the main problems
with Interprovider interconnections as they stand today, in that each provider today subjectively
decides whether to interconnect with another provider on a network-by-network basis, and therefore
such interconnections follow no deterministic model.
The BPP initiative has currently stalled, as large networks apparently see nothing to gain
from joining
it.172
In fact, they probably saw a lot to lose. In the current state of affairs, large
networks have the advantage of negotiating interconnection agreements under NDA's in which, as
has been discussed, they often have a decided advantage. By moving to the BPP, they would be
required to peer with other providers in which they may have otherwise negotiated some kind of
provider relationship in which they would have been by the other provider for the interconnection.
Why Industry Self-regulation Will Fail
Open frameworks, MLPA's, and initiatives such as Brokered Private Peering have all failed,
and there is not likely to be any industry led proposal that will succeed in enforcing Internet
interconnections. The reason for this is that large networks are currently able to negotiate payments
for interconnections with other networks, and they could potentially lose this revenue stream if
settlement free interconnections of any kind were required. In all cases of self-regulation, networks
would have to share more information than they do today, thus giving away what they see as an
advantage in any negotiations. The industry simply has not been able to regulate itselfwith respect
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to fair and non-discriminatory mechanisms for the exchange of
traffic173
and that is not likely to
change.
Conclusions: Government Regulation
To date, the FCC has maintained the separation of
"basic"
traditional telephony services and
"enhanced"
information services, which means that information services have remained
unregulated. Therefore, interconnections between Internet Service Providers have not been and are
currently not regulated. However, as admitted by the FCC, "the distinction between the
traditionally regulated and unregulated sectors of the industry is
blurring.174"
In a recent Office of
Plans and Policy (OPP) paper entitled "The FCC and the Unregulation of the
Internet,175"
Jason
Oxman documented the history of how the FCC has tried to not regulate information services and
instead let a non-regulated, market driven industry evolve. The paper's recommendations to the
FCC are to maintain such a stance, but do leave open the door for possible regulation ifnecessary:
1 . Do not automatically impose legacy regulations on new technologies.
2. When Internet-based services replace traditional legacy services, begin to deregulate the
old instead of regulate the new.
3. Maintain a watchful eye to ensure that anti-competitive behavior does not develop, do
not regulate on the perception of potential future bottlenecks, and be careful that any
regulatory responses are the minimum necessary
and outweigh the costs of regulation.
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The key point is that the FCC must ensure that anti-competitive behaviors do not develop and that if
they do, any regulations they develop are the minimum necessary. The question is whether or not
any of the industry's actions to date can be classified as anti-competitive. In light of the fact that so
far market pressures have kept the fundamental tenant of end-to-end connectivity in tact means that
the actions which have occurred under NDA's have not yet had to be reviewed by the Justice
Department or the FCC to determine if such actions are anti-competitive. However, peering
policies and peering negotiations of ISPs will likely be reviewed at some point because so many
small ISPs have complained about possible anti-competitive behaviors of large ISPs. Once such a
review occurs, if the Justice Department and FCC find that market entry or growth have been
hindered by the actions of certain large ISPs, they are likely to regulate Internet interconnections.
It is clear that the FCC will become involved with Internet issues to maintain a competitive
market place as is evidenced by several of their actions to date. In the case of how the Internet is
affecting access charges and reciprocal compensation of traditional telephony providers, the FCC
issued a ruling that Internet traffic is jurisdictionally mixed in nature, meaning that it appears to be
mostly interstate, in which case the FCC would have the authority to regulate it, but that it was still
exempt from access charges. Basically, the FCC had no current classifications for which such
issues fit into. The same is true ofmany services that are offered over the Internet today or will be
offered over it shortly, such as high quality voice over IP. In such cases of convergence, the FCC




and can therefore not fit them into
their current regulated or non-regulated boxes.
As telephony services migrate to the Internet, several factors will make the FCC seriously






services. Those individuals that have ISPs that offer voice services or
those that use software that provides voice over IP are likely to discontinue traditional local
telephone services as the quality of voice over the Internet improves. Therefore, over time, the
Universal Service Fund may deplete to the point that offering rural customers phone services for
prices similar to those in urban areas is no longer possible. Offering such service to all citizens has
been a basic tenant of the government because lack of such service is seen as a social and
economical barrier between those who can't afford the service and those who can.
In addition, affordable local phone service (made possible for some only via the Universal
Service Fund) provides universal reachability to everyone else that has phone service. Such
reachability is vitally important for such things as emergency services via 911. In the case of the
Internet, universal end-to-end connectivity is only occurring due to market pressures. Having a
vital service kept in check by something as unstable as market pressure is clearly not a good idea.
Therefore, as a critical mass of users migrate basic phone service to the Internet, ensuring universal
reachability will be deemed necessary by the FCC, and this can only be done via regulations of
interconnections.
It is certainly interesting to recall the case ofhow the Internet is affecting access charges and
reciprocal compensation. The FCC has stated that the status quo of leaving such negotiations to the
commercial entities as a first pass is ideal, but that the FCC could become the final arbiter when
there are breakdowns in such negotiations. Such settlement based interconnections between ILECs,
CLECs, and IXCs are not that different from interconnections between ISPs, and it is not difficult to
imagine the FCC extending their recommendation from
access charges and reciprocal compensation
to ISP interconnections.
If government regulation of interconnections is deemed necessary, as seems likely based on
the discussion above, the issue of settlement-based vs. settlement free interconnections will need to
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be addressed. At this point, there are too many issues with settlement based interconnections such
as defining a valid accounting unit that can be measured with today's equipment and the fact that it
is very easy to generate bogus traffic that is nearly impossible to detect and tract that could shift the
revenue flows. Therefore, it is unlikely that settlements can be a part of any government regulation
for the foreseeable future. Without such a mechanism, deciding which networks should connect to
each other on a peer basis (i.e. no money changes hands) and on a transit relationship (i.e. one
network pays the other) is difficult to do. It simply cannot be that any network can freely
interconnect to any other network, or a small regional network would get a "free
ride"
on the
infrastructure of a large national network. Some kind of classification system, similar to the one
defined by the Brokered Private Peering Group will need to be administrated by the government.
It is obvious that the regulation of Internet interconnections is not a trivial manner and will
take a very large effort by the FCC and the Internet industry. It is also obvious that any such work
will not please all parties involved. However, as the Internet becomes the transport medium for all
kinds of services, including such vital elements as 91 1 emergency connectivity, ensuring end-to-end
reachability for all connected entities will certainly
become necessary. The only question that
remains is how quickly the Internet will become vital
for enough services that relying on market




interconnection negotiations between two networks gone bad, such that a large customer or
customers lose enough money or, potentially something
even more tragic such as loss of life or
property as more and more crucial
services move to the net, before the government steps in.
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Appendix: Timeline
1890 Congress passes Sherman Antitrust Act
1914 Sherman Act amended by Clayton Antitrust Act
1934 Communications Act of 1 934 passed
1964 Paul Baran ofRAND publishes "On Distributed Communications
Networks"
1966 FCC opens Computer Inquiry I
1969 Experimental ARPANet goes on-line with funding from DARPA
1971 FCC issues final decision for Computer Inquiry I declaring that data services would
not be regulated and that common carriers could only offer data services through affiliates
1973 Vint Cerf develops TCP/IP
1976 ARPANet begins experimenting with TCP/IP
1980 FCC issues final ruling for Computer Inquiry II, defining basic service provider and
enhanced service provider and that ESPs would not be regulated
1983 All computers on ARPANet required to use TCP/IP
1984 MILNet separate from ARPANet
1984 NSF creates five super computer centers via NSF backbone, connects to ARPANET
1985 NSFNet created with multiple regional networks and university computer centers
1986 FCC released Computer Inquiry III, replacing the "separate
affiliate"
stipulation of
Computer Inquiry I with a model of safeguards
1987 NSF awards contract toMerit, in partnership with IBM and MCI, to upgrade the NSFNet
to Tl speeds
1989 NSFNet upgrade to multiple redundant Tl's between nodes
1989 Merit, IBM, andMCI present plan to upgrade network to T3
1990 Merit, IBM, andMCI create Advanced Network Services (ANS) to operate the backbone




1991 Upgrade ofNSFNet to T3 completed
1991 Commercial Internet eXchange (CIX) and Federal Internet eXchange (FIX) established
1991 Metropolitan Area Exchanges (MAE's) established
1992 Congress subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology conducts investigation of
Privatization
1993 NSF issues solicitation NSF 93-52 to breakup the NSF backbone into a multiple backbone
architecture with interconnections at Network Access Points (NAPs)
1995 NSFNet officially shut down
1996 Telecommunications Act of 1996 passed
1997 Emergence of hybrid private-peering and private peering between large networks
1997 UUNET and Sprint announce end of
"free"
peering unless the peer met certain
requirements
1997 FCC issues Access Reform Order declaring ISPs were not required to pay interstate
access charges for local Internet connection calls
1998 FCC declares that Information Service Providers would not have to contribute to the
Universal Service Fund
1998 Mike Gaddis introduces industry self-regulation proposal ofBrokered Private Peering
1999 FCC releases Reciprocal Compensation Order declaring that common carriers were
bound by their existing reciprocal compensation obligations to ISPs
1999 Internet Freedom Act of 1999 introduced by Senator Boucher and Goodlatte to lift Inter-
LATA restrictions on RBOCs
1999 FCC issues order revising the Communications Act of 1996's original order of unbundling
network elements, declaring that ILECs were not required to unbundle certain network
elements for broadband Internet connections
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